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INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this thesis is to depict one consequence of the Financial Crisis of 2007-08: the fast 
increase of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) ratios observed in several economies. 
The last financial crisis originates mainly from a real estate market boom; this, itself, is not 
different from a lot of past crisis. The Great Depression, the Asian Crisis of the 1990s, the 
Dot-com bubble and the recent one were all preceded by a “boom period”, with high 
economic growth and easy supply of credit, lasting until a trigger event bursts the bubble and 
initiate a phase of instability and recession. 
The growth in the United States started to suffer with the increase of interest rates imposed by 
the FED in 2006 and when the housing market turned in 2007. In September 2008, with the 
failure of Lehman Brothers and subsequently failure or bailout of many other institutions, the 
crisis deepened radically and spread all over the world. 
As a consequence a fast rise of NPLs has been observed both in the United States and in the 
Euro area. Persistently high levels of NPLs constitute a major problem since they reduce 
banks’ profitability due to the higher provisions required and tie up relevant amount of 
capital, thus impairing lending and ultimately jeopardizing economic activity. 
Although the trend reverted radically in USA since 2010, the same did not happen in Europe; 
where the NPL Ratio started to decrease only from 2014 and the level is still high in 
comparison with pre-crisis ratio. 
The build-up of large volumes of bad loans depends on group-management decision, but it 
also affected by the general economic conditions. Moreover, also structural obstacles, i.e. 
underdeveloped distressed debt markets and shortages in supervisory and legal frameworks, 
cause at least a part of the persistency. 
Most of the recent literature focused on the causes of NPLs and suggested or analysed a 
number of actions to speed up the resolution process. Our research instead, focuses on the 
substantial difference between the price offered by investors and the net book value of NPLs, 
i.e. the “Price GAP”, as one of the main factors hindering the development of a distressed 
debt market. To overcome the shortage of publicly available data on NPLs’ sale prices, the 
estimation provided by Ciavoliello et al. (2016) has been used. 
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The analysis is based on a sample of ten commercial Italian banks. For each of them we 
estimate the Price GAP under different hypothesis and the subsequent losses following a 
massive sale of Bad loans. Moreover, an assessment of this theoretical exercise on capital 
ratios is carried out, estimating both the effect on the Common Equity Tier 1 Capital and on 
Risk-weighted Assets. 
The present work is therefore organized as follow.  
Chapter 1 provides a general overview of the Financial Crisis of 2007-08; describing the main 
causes, effects and measures taken at global level. Then focuses on the new Regulatory 
Framework implemented in the European Union as a response and finally devotes some 
attention to two consequences, strictly correlated with each other, of the crisis: the credit 
crunch and the increase in NPLs. 
In Chapter 2, after describing some general evidences about the creation of value through 
divestitures, we present a comprehensive strategy to the NPLs problem focusing mainly on 
the management and disposals of NPL stocks. Then a comparison between internal and 
external solutions is carried out. Lastly, the possibility to resort to a Bad Bank is analysed, 
also through some recently examples, and some considerations concerning the compatibility 
between Bad Banks and the actual EU regulatory framework are represented.   
Chapter 3 focuses on the Price Gap, highlighting the rationale for a better understanding of it. 
Then explain the interesting features of Italy that, despite some reforms, remains one of the 
European countries with the highest level of NPLs. After reviewing the significant literature 
and explaining how the data were collected or estimated, we discuss the main results and 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 1. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-08: STRICTER 
REGULATIONS AND NPLs AS CONSEQUENCES 
 
1.1 General Overview 
In the past, economies have been afflicted by a long sequence of crises and recessions. If we 
take a look to financial crisis in the nineteenth century, some common characteristics exist. 
Episodes of increasing prosperity led to investment and credit expanding, simultaneously, the 
price of assets increase and stimulate speculative buying. At some point the bubble would 
burst, subsequently bank lending sharp decrease causing a recession (meant as major 
downturns in production, employment and income), triggering the bankruptcy of the weakest 
firms and arranging the basis for the next period of expansion (Evans, 2010).  
The most serious crisis of the 20th century started in 1929 with the US stock market crash and 
takes the name of “Great Depression”. As a consequence the US unemployment rate rose 
from 2.9% in 1929 to 22.9% in 1932, in the same period GDP fell by 26% (Crafts, 2010) and 
by 1932 one quarter of banks in the United States declared bankruptcy (Markham, 2000). 
Hence, a number of measures to regulate the financial sector have been promptly introduced 
by the Roosevelt government.  
Among the others, it is worth mentioning the Glass-Steagall Act (introducing the separation 
between commercial and investment banks), the set-up of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the creation of a Federal Insurance administrated by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in order to prevent bank runs. Following the 
introduction of this tighter regulation the US did not experience any severe financial crisis 
since 1940s up to the early 1970s. 
At the same time, from the late 1960s, three major changes have been observed in the US 
banking system: the introduction of new technologies in part to get round of regulations as 
well as to intentionally obscure the risks involved, a propensity toward internationalisation 
and a strong process of financial deregulation. 
Following the process of deregulation and innovations there was an enormous growth of the 
financial sector. Both these factors, together with a poor supervision, contribute to the savings 
and loan crisis of the 1980s leading to a short recession in 1990 (Sherman, 2009). In the 
period between 1986 and 1995, more than one thousand thrifts failed and the total thrift 
industry shrunk from 3,234 to 1,645 institutions. Moreover, the crisis had produced losses for 
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approximately $153 billion, of which $124 billion payed by taxpayers (Curry and Shibut, 
2000). 
Since the second half of the 1990s until 2007 the US economy experienced two further 
expansions. The first was driven by a boom in information technology (Dot-com bubble) and 
finished in early 2000; triggering a recession in the subsequent year and a collapse in prices 
similar to the crash in 1929 (the Nasdaq Composite Index lost almost 78% of its value from 
the peak to the bottom1). The latter was mainly driven by a boom in house price, and greatly 
contributed to the last Financial Crisis. 
 
1.2 The Financial Crisis of 2007-08 
As emphasized by the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the main source of the 
Financial Crisis of 2007-08 was the real estate market boom (Bernanke, 2009). This, itself, is 
not divergent from a lot of past crises. The Great Depression, the Asian Crisis of the 1990s, 
the Dot-com bubble and the recent financial crisis were all preceded by a “boom period” with 
high economic growth and easy supply of credit, lasting until a trigger event, varying from 
crisis to crisis, bursts the bubble and initiate a phase of instability, depression or recession 
(Norgren, 2010). 
A great change in comparison to previous crisis is the strong role of securitization, especially 
of subprime mortgages. The main advantage of securitization is the possibility to transform an 
illiquid asset into a liquid one and therefore, selling securitized loans, reduce capital 
requirements2. Thus, capital requirements themselves stimulated the securitization of loans. 
Securitization has a lot of pluses but also serious shortcomings, e.g. risks could be 
underestimate and the diversification effect might be miscalculate, as it happened with non-
prime loans. 
In the early 2000s the fraction of subprime and Alt-A3 mortgages was relatively small and 
most of them were not securitized. After few years the situation changed deeply, the subprime 
market rapidly increased and the majority of these loans were securitized (by 2006 75% of 
subprime and 91% of Alt-A mortgages were securitized, in 2001 only 46% and 18% 
                                                          
1 It fell from 5,048.62 (March 10, 2000) to 1,114.11 (October 9, 2002).  
2 Central banks of the G10 countries established a Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices  
which led in 1988 to the introduction of an international agreement, the Basel Accord, requiring minimum 
capital ratio for banks to provide a buffer to absorb losses (BIS, 2015). 
3 Alt-A mortgages are between prime and subprime in terms of credit quality. 
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respectively) (Udell, 2009). Unfortunately, much of this lending was poorly done; bankers 
who made the mortgages had small incentives to worry about credit quality as they sold the 
mortgages as soon as possible. 
Such trend started to suffer with the growth of interest rates imposed by the FED (from 1.5% 
in 2004 to 5.25% in 2006) and when the housing market turned in 2007 (the variation in 
house prices was -9.7% in 2007 and -15.3% in 2008) (Iannuzzi and Berardi, 2010).  
As a consequence a part of borrowers start to became insolvent. During the first half of 2007 
counterparty risk between banks rose, since no one knew which institutions were solvent and 
which were not. In September 2008, with the failure of Lehman Brothers and subsequently 
failure or bailout of many other institutions, the crisis deepened radically and spread all over 
the world. 
At this point liquidity in the interbank markets almost disappeared, pushing a lot of 
institutions highly dependent on such short-term loans close to the bankruptcy. Central banks 
in US and Europe immediately and repeatedly pushed big amounts of money into inter-bank 
markets and cuts interest rates. Furthermore governments, of major European countries and 
US, announced plans to directly invest capital in troubled banks. 
Emergency measures reached the goal to stop the chain of failures but fail to prevent a 
collapse in bank lending, the commonly named “credit crunch”, both in US and in Europe 
(Evans, 2010). As explained in Section 1.5, a credit crunch is one of the main channels 
through which a banking crisis may have an impact on the real economy. 
At the same time precautionary savings increased and planned investments were postponed 
due to a general increase in uncertainty; hence aggregate demand fell down (Norgren, 2010). 
World trade dropped and by the second half of 2008 a recession hit most of the developed 
countries, originating the so-called “Great Recession”. 
In the US, the downturn started in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 (NBER4), in the 
same period the unemployment rate rose from 5% to almost 10%, then the trend steadily 
revert reaching pre-crisis level by late 2015. S&P500 lost almost 57% of its value from 
October 2007 to March 2009 (FRED5). 
The crash was transmitted to Europe through the close linkage with the US financial sector, 
the strong dependency on exports and, in some cases, due to macroeconomic imbalances that 
started to correct. Asian countries were considered less exposed since their financial markets 
                                                          
4 National Bureau of Economic Research. 
5 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Research. 
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are less integrated with others; nevertheless the crisis spread through a collapse in the demand 
for exports. 
As regard EU, there had been a considerable fall in the rate of increase of GDP already in 
2008, followed by a contraction in real GDP of 4.4 % in 2009 and by an additional mild one 
in 2012. The unemployment rate rose from 6.8% in the second quarter of 2008, to 11% in the 
second quarter of 2013 (with a small drop between mid-2010 and first quarter of 2011); since 
then the ratio started to decrease, reaching 7.7% in July 2017. However, inside the EU, the 
figures varied considerably both over time and between Member States (Eurostat). 
The financial and economic crisis had also significant effects on public balances all over the 
world. Especially in Europe, where in 2010 the subprime crisis was immediately followed by 
the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, and some governments had trouble to refund their own 
debt6. Ureche-Rangaua and Burietza (2013) show a linkage, statistically significant, between 
the volume of capital injections provided by the different European governments to banks and 
the level of long-term sovereign interest rate spreads. In addition, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2017) explained how the euro area experienced significant fragmentation across national 
sovereign bond markets since the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis, and also 
that negative shock to yield in stressed countries moved French and German yields in the 
opposite direction. This flight to quality phenomenon largely disappears after the ECB’s 
announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program in 2012, although no 
country has ever requested the OMT programme to be used. 
How did it happen? Several theories have been developed; among the others Evans (2010) 
identified five main roots to explain the financial crisis. 
The first one concerns the role of perverse incentives for several actors: the sale staffs, the 
banks that have originated the loans (focused on generating as many mortgages as possible 
and not on credit quality), the investment banks, and the rating agencies (involved in a severe 
conflict of interest). 
The second argument involved the US interest rate policy, since in the period 2001-2004 
according to some economists the US central bank kept the interest rate too low for too long 
time. On the other hand, this criticism fails to recognize that without such measures crises in 
1990 and in 2001 would have been worse. 
                                                          
6 For some countries large public deficits reflect a not solid fiscal position also before the crisis started, indeed 
some governments used to borrow heavily to finance their budgets, accumulating impressive amount of debts. 
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Another approach identifies the source of the crisis into the large inflows of capital to US 
mostly from developing countries that had large current account surpluses. Savings inflows 
from abroad can be valuable if the receiving country invests them well, unfortunately US 
financial institutions reacted to this surplus by competing for borrowers through relatively 
cheap and easy to obtain credit (Bernanke, 2009).  
The fourth focuses on the US financial sector’s deregulation. The abolishment of legal limits 
on interest rates occurred in 1980 contributes to the development of subprime loans (allowing 
for much worse conditions than normal loans), while the effect of removing the separation 
between commercial and investment banks (completed in 1999 with the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act) is more debated. According to Udell (2009) and Crafts and Fearon (2010) the 
combination of commercial and investment banks into an “universal bank” is likely to create a 
new entity less risky than the two stand-alone corporations, moreover empirical evidences 
suggest a low correlations between these two activities allowing for a risk reduction up to 
40%. Moreover Iannuzzi and Berardi (2010, p. 285) argue that the Glass-Steagall Act  “has 
allowed an uncontrolled development of investment banks …  developing the same activities 
and offering similar services as commercial banks, but under no regulation and control of 
risk”. 
The last identifies the excess capital accumulated in US and Europe as a cause.  
Other factors that contributed are the shift toward higher risk taking to obtain a predetermined 
return because of low interest rates during the last decade, the underestimation of systemic 
risk, the increasing dependency on wholesale funding markets which are less stable than 
deposits, the fragmentation and lack of coherence between supervisory bodies both in the US 
and the EU, a lack of international coordination and harmonization, and the presence of 
explicit or implicit governments guarantee originating long term undermining effects7 
(Norgren, 2010). 
What has been done? As previously mentioned, several emergency measures together with 
more long-term actions, have been undertaken.  
At a global level a set of non-binding proposals, aimed at providing a new regulatory 
framework to improve financial stability, has been arranged by the Group of 20 (G20) 
together with the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The two main pillars are a new set of 
banking standards, the Basel III framework, and a set of recommendations for the resolution 
                                                          
7 To some extent, the absence of proper winding up procedure for banks forced the governments to bail-out 
insolvent institutions to avoid “domino effect”. 
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regimes of financial institutions. The former tool is aimed at preventing a new financial crisis, 
while the latter is intended to protect taxpayers and to solve the lack of proper resolution 
process to avoid, if a banking failure occurs, the triggering of a systemic crisis (Perrut 2012). 
At the European level, ECB played a crucial role in containing the crisis with standard and 
non-standard policies, e.g. the Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) followed in 2014 
by the Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs), the Outright Monetary 
Transaction (OTM) programme8 and the Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) 
introduced in January 2015.  
Moreover, to prevent a complete meltdown of the financial system, several governments used 
exceptional amount of State aid to rescue their banks. Hence, the important role of the 
Commission, about the evaluation of the Rescue Plans under the State aid rules, should be 
mentioned (see Section 1.3).  
Similarly European countries as a whole reacted to the debt crisis with emergency measures, 
e.g. the set-up of two temporary financial backstops9 to help countries experiencing financing 
problems, and with more long-term actions to ensure competitiveness, promote growth and 
guarantee sound public finances (European Commission, 2014).  
Finally, the response of the EU institutions can also be captured in a set of 40 legislative 
proposals, several of them motivated by the G20 agenda, which radically changed the EU 
financial regulatory framework (The European Union Committee, 2015). This last aspect, 
with a focus on the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), is analysed in the 
Section 1.4. 
 
1.3 The State Aid rules and the role of the European Commission  
Starting from 2008 the European Commission adopted a set of crisis rule, i.e. four different 
“Crisis Communications”, to coordinate the support to the financial sector during the crisis. 
The Commission’s assessment, under this set of temporary State aid rules, is aimed at 
restoring long-term viability of the rescued institutions10, minimising the use of taxpayers’ 
money and taking all the measures necessary to limit the potential distortion of competition. 
                                                          
8 This program refers to the outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets. 
9 These two temporary funds have been replaced in 2012 by a new and permanent one: the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). 
10 When the long-term viability condition is no more met, i.e. the institution is unable to cover all its costs and 
generate an appropriate return on equity, the distressed bank should be liquidated. 
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The preservation of financial stability was also crucial. For this reason the Commission 
initially allowed relatively generous conditions, nevertheless during the evolution of the crisis 
this set of rules has been repeatedly updated and tightened. With the last update, applicable 
from 1st august 2013, a new Banking Communication has been implemented. The main 
change, besides a more effective restructuring process, is a further strengthening of the burden 
sharing requirements in order to curtail the public intervention and the consequently moral 
hazard problem. No contribution is required from senior debt holders, on the other hand, 
before State aid is granted, subordinated debt and hybrid capital must be fully converted into 
equity or written down (European Commission, 2013). 
The figures are quite impressive, since the beginning of the crisis almost 30% of the European 
banking system (by assets) received support subject to State aid rules. European countries 
have provided to distressed financial institutions €671 billion in capitals and repayable loans, 
i.e. 5.4% of EU’s GDP in 2008, and €1,288 billion in guarantees, equivalent to 10.3% of 
GDP. The latter reflects the total of peak amounts issued by each government, afterword the 
volume of liquidity supports dropped as the crisis became progressively less strong. 
The findings of Adamczyk and Windisch (2015) support the effectiveness of these 
restructuring plans. First, with the application of restructuring strategies a significant 
improvement in operational and risk indicators and in funding and solvency positions of 
rescued institutions has been observed. Secondly, approaching the end of the restructuring 
period (five years), the performances of the group of supported banks and of the peer cluster 
of non-aided institutions tend to converge. Finally, most of the banks subject to State aid 
control passed the Comprehensive Assessment conducted by the European Central Bank in 
2014. 
 
1.4 The new Regulatory Framework in the European Union 
1.4.1 The Banking Union 
As the crisis worsened it became clear how an economic and monetary union, without a 
centralised application of EU rules for banks, were not enough and more had to be done. 
According to the Commission “the financial crisis showed that no Member State alone can 
regulate the financial sector and supervise financial stability risks when financial markets are 
integrated” (The European Union Committee, 2015; p. 21), that is why, in June 2002 
Governments agreed to create a Banking Union. The new regulatory framework applies to all 
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the financial institutions in the EU and it is set out in a Single Rulebook (European 
Commission, 2015). 
The three main pillars are: 
 The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), that introduces the directly supervision by the 
ECB of the most significant banks while the national supervisors, within an integrated 
system, continue to monitor the remaining banks. 
 The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), compulsory for banks subject to the SSM. It 
should allow the bank resolutions (if all else fails) to be managed efficiently by a Single 
Resolution Board (SRB), in cooperation with national resolution authorities (NRAs), and 
to be financed by the banking sector through a Single Resolution Fund (SRF). 
 The third mainstay, originally, was the creation of a Single Deposit Guarantee 
Mechanism but it was quickly dropped in favour of a recast of the directive on Deposit 
Guarantees Schemes (DGS), reinforcing and improving the coordination of national 
deposit insurance systems. Nevertheless, in November 2015, the Commission made a 
proposal for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which would offer a more 
uniform degree of insurance across the Eurozone in case of bank failures. 
The banking union’s objectives are to break the vicious circle between sovereign and bank 
crisis and make the banking system safer, i.e. reducing the probability that banks would fail 
and the impact that the eventually failure of an institution could have. These goals are reached 
through three subsequent phases. For all these phases, especially the second and the third, a 
crucial role is played by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and by the 
SRM Regulation. 
The first one is commonly referred as crisis prevention. It includes the implementation of the 
Basel III standards into the EU legal framework, other core improvements as the already 
mentioned SSM, the creation of a macro-prudential oversight body, the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), and the set-up of three sector oriented supervisory authorities (ESAs)11. 
The ESAs, with binding powers on financial institution, have been created to ensure a 
consistent application of EU-level rules, to resolve conflicts concerning individual cross-
border institutions and to enhance consumer protection. 
The second, named early intervention is aimed to ensure the adoption of timely corrective 
action when problems occur, but before the situation become critical.  
                                                          
11 The three new authorities are: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). 
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The last phase, crisis management, is triggered when the situation deteriorates irreparably and 
is intended to protect taxpayers and depositors (European Commission, 2015). 
Besides the Banking Union, several others reforms have been done, with the general aims of 
enhancing transparency (e.g. a regulation concerning credit rating agencies and the 
improvement of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive), improving resilience and 
stability of the financial sector, and strengthening the protection of consumer (e.g. measures 
on short selling and credit default swaps). 
1.4.2 The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
Due to the particular nature of banks, normal insolvency rules have been shown to be 
inadequate for the resolution. 
The functioning of banks is based on trust, i.e. if customers and counterparties lose confidence 
in the bank’s ability to meet their obligations the institution may become quickly unviable, 
furthermore, due to the degree of connections between institutions problem in one bank might 
spreads to the entire system. These destabilizing effects greatly contributes to the belief that 
“too big to fail” banks will always be rescued by national governments.  
This main source of moral hazard could be reduced through a proper resolution system, i.e. by 
establishing the credible promise that consequences of careless management will be full 
burden by bank’s shareholders and unsecured creditors through bail-in, and no more through 
massive bail-outs funded by taxpayers. At the same time an effective system must keep 
secured depositors safe and, contrary to ordinary bankruptcy procedures12, guarantee the 
continuity of failing institutions’ basic functions (Bruzzone et al., 2015). 
These recommendations are the foundation of the new Resolution Mechanism, established by 
2014, and fully in force since the beginning of 201613. The two main legal measures on which 
is based the new system are the BRRD together with the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) Regulation. Moreover the BRRD conferred the power to adopt delegated acts to the 
Commission. Likewise EBA is entrusted with the development of draft regulatory and 
implementing technical standards, and could also issue guidelines or recommendations under 
its own initiative. 
                                                          
12 Ordinary procedures managed in court typically require the suspension of all failing banks’ claims for  a too 
long period. 
13 Member States were required to adopt and publish by 31 December 2014 the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive. Moreover they shall apply these provisions 
from 1 January 2015, or at the latest from 1 January 2016 as regards Section 5 of Chapter IV of Title IV. 
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The new framework envisages the three different phases mentioned before: preparation and 
prevention, early intervention and crisis management.  
Preparation and prevention 
In the first stage banks and authorities need to make a suitable preparation for crisis. For this 
reason recovery plans, defining the measures institutions will take to remain viable if their 
financial situation were to deteriorate significantly, should be arranged by banks and updated 
at least annually or after a relevant change. Meanwhile resolution authorities are required to 
set down resolution plans, for each institution or group, explaining the actions are triggered 
when the conditions for resolution are met. Overall this first phase is complex and requires a 
close cooperation between all the subjects involved, i.e. banks, supervisory authorities and 
resolution authorities, in order to ensure that each one is fully informed. 
Early Intervention 
The second phase is triggered when there are specific signals of financial distress, for instance 
when the institution infringes or in the near future is likely to break prudential requirements, 
but before the situation worsens irreparably so that resolve the bank remains the only option. 
The BRRD requires member states to grant to the competent supervisory authorities (the ECB 
or national supervisors according to the SSM rules) a broad range of early intervention 
powers. An appropriate deadline for the achievement of each early intervention measure 
should be defined by them; moreover competent authorities are also in charge to monitor 
compliance and shall notify the development of the situation to the resolution authorities 
without delay. 
Crisis Management 
The last phase, i.e. the administrative procedure called resolution, starts if the situation 
deteriorates beyond repair, reached this point shareholders no longer retain responsibility and 
control. The procedure could begin only when all these three conditions are met: the 
institution (or group) is failing or likely to fail; there is no reasonable prospect that any 
alternative private sector measures would prevent the failure within a reasonable timeframe; 
and a resolution action is necessary in the public interest.  
What does “failing or likely to fail” means? As stated by the BRRD an institution is deemed 
to be failing or likely to fail in one or more of the following four circumstances: when it 
infringes or is close to infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation; when the assets 
of the institution are, or are likely to be in the near future, less than its liabilities; when it is, or 
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is close to be, unable to pay its debts as they fall due; and when extraordinary public financial 
support is required (except in the specific circumstances write down in the Directive). 
When all the three previous conditions are met, the resolution authorities are allowed to use 
the following four tools, either individually or in any combination (with the exception of the 
asset separation tool, which must be always applied in combination with another one): 
a) The sale of business; 
b) The bridge institution; 
c) The asset separation; 
d) The bail-in. 
With the sale of business tool, authorities can sell parts of the institution under resolution to a 
purchaser (different from a bridge institution), also without the approval of shareholders. The 
transfer shall be made on commercial term, in accordance with the State aid framework and 
with the aim of maximize the sale price. 
The bridge institution tool is intended to facilitate the continuous access to deposits and to 
preserve essential banking functions. According to the BRRD is possible to transfer 
instruments of ownership, assets, right or liabilities of institutions under resolution to a new 
entity, at least partially owned by public authority and controlled by the resolution authority. 
When conditions are appropriate, the bridge institution should be put back on the market on 
commercial terms and in accordance with the State aid framework, e.g. merging it with 
another entity or selling it to a third party; if it is not possible the institution must be wound 
up. 
The asset separation tool involves the transfer of assets, rights or liabilities of a bridge 
institutions or an institution under resolution to one or more asset management vehicles, at 
least partially owned by public authority and controlled by the resolution authority. With asset 
management vehicles (also called “bad banks”) is possible to separate good and bad assets, 
and therefore maximizes the value of the second category through sale or orderly liquidation. 
The bail-in tool consists in the possibility of write down the institution’s liabilities or converts 
debt into equity. It is of decisive importance in the new framework since it makes sound the 
promise that shareholders and creditors have to accept losses in case of bankruptcy of the 
institution, “putting an end to the era of massive bail-outs paid by taxpayers” (Bruzzone et al., 
2015; p. 3). 
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Resolution authorities may apply this tool either when the objective is to recapitalize the 
institution or to reduce the principal amount of debt instruments that are transferred to other 
institutions (or equivalently to convert debts into equity before transfer them). 
In the first case the bail-in tool should be used only when, together with the application of 
other relevant measures, there is a realistic prospect to restore the financial soundness and 
long term viability of the entity under resolution. 
The BRRD establishes some general principles governing the resolution. The main rules are 
the following: shareholders bear the first losses; creditors bear losses after them according to 
the priority defined under national insolvency law (therefore starting from subordinated debt 
and then, down the line, up to uninsured deposits); and finally no creditor shall incur greater 
losses than would have been incurred if the institution had been wound up under normal 
insolvency proceedings (“no creditor worse-off principle”). In any case covered deposits (up 
to € 100.000 under the Deposit Insurance directive) and some others liabilities are explicitly 
excluded from the resolution procedures14. 
The write down and conversion powers of capital instruments only (i.e. Common Equity Tier 
1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2) may be exercised either independently or in combination with 
a resolution action. Instead the bail-in tool, so within a resolution process, applies to a larger 
set of liabilities. 
Thus, the new bail-in tool goes much further than burden-sharing under State aid Control (see 
Figure 1). Anyway, all measures entailing public financial support, also during a resolution, 
has to comply with the relevant State aid rules and the Commission will continue to exercise 
its exclusive competence to control if the proposals made by the Resolution authorities satisfy 
the requirement of a sufficient burden sharing (European Commission, 2013). Additionally, 
when the SRF is involved in the resolution of a bank, the SRB has to notify its use to the 
Commission, and the Commission has to assess its compatibility with the rules on State aid. 
Finally it is important to remember that the granting of “extraordinary public financial 
support”, i.e. State aid, is itself one of the conditions that trigger the start of a resolution 
procedure (with some exceptions). 
In exceptional circumstances, the resolution authority may exclude (or partially exclude) 
certain liabilities from the application of the write-down or conversion powers. In this case, 
when the losses that would have been borne by those liabilities have not been passed on fully 
                                                          
14 On the other hand DGSs are liable “for the amount by which covered deposits would have been written 
down …, had covered deposits been included within the scope of bail-in” (Art 109 of BRRD, 2014). 
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to other creditors, “resolution financing arrangements” may contribute under specific 
conditions provided by the Article 45 of the BRRD. The most important establishes that, the 
use of these funds is permitted only after a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation, 
equal to an amount not less than 8% of the total liabilities (including own funds), has been 
made by the shareholders and eligible creditors. These specific national financial 
arrangements are designed for support the effective working of resolution tools without 
involving taxpayers, since contributions to these arrangements are made by the banking sector 
(either ex-ante or ex-post). 
Figure 1 
 
Source:  Magnus and Mesnard 2016. 
 
The BRRD establishes a minimum set of harmonised rules but leaves to the Member States 
discretion in the application of the tools and in the use of national financial arrangements. To 
eliminate the risk of inconsistent decisions between states, the SRM Regulation establishes a 
more centralized architecture for all the decisions concerning the resolution.  
In particular, this Regulation creates a “resolution network” composed by the Single 
Resolution Board (acting as a resolution authority for banks directly supervised by the ECB 
and cross border groups) and by National Resolution Authorities (for the other banks); in 
addition it establishes the allocation of competences between the SRB and NRAs.  
Moreover it creates an integrated system of financial arrangements aimed to support 
resolution, that relies on the Single Resolution Fund since “if the funding of resolution were 
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to remain national in the longer term, the link between sovereigns and the banking sector 
would not be fully broken, and investors would continue to establish borrowing conditions 
according to the place of establishment of the banks rather than to their creditworthiness” 
(Recital 19 of SRM Regulation, 2014). The SRF is financed by all the banks of participating 
Member States by means of contributions raised at national level on an annual basis15. 
Initially resources will be collected in national compartments, and then they will be gradually 
mutualized. 
 
1.5 Credit crunch and Non-Performing Loans 
1.5.1 Credit crunch 
The impaired ability of the private sector to obtain the credit needed to fund investment and 
consumption is one of the main channels through which a banking crisis may have an impact 
on the real economy. Therefore is important to understand to what extent the dry up in bank 
liquidity, after the failure of Lehman Brothers, reduced the availability of credit. 
As already mentioned the measures implemented by Central Banks and Governments, in the 
early stages, fail to prevent a credit crunch in the developed economies. Indeed after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers credit growth plummeted both in US and in Europe.  
Iyer et al. (2014), using Portugal’s lending data, provide three main evidences of this 
phenomenon. The first result shows how problems in the interbank market induced a 
contraction of credit supply primarily for entrepreneurial (younger and smaller) firms, 
moreover for these companies is particularly difficult to compensate the reduction with other 
sources of credit therefore the credit crunch was binding. Besides this, evidences show a 
stronger decline of credit supply for banks with higher interbank borrowing ratio and greater 
level of non-performing loans prior to the crisis. Finally, the injection of money from central 
banks had limited overall positive effects on credit supply even if banks with higher liquidity 
problems used the central bank help mostly to hoard liquidity. 
Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) reached similar conclusions studying the Italian banking 
system: a generalized and excessive tightening of credit policies have been observed. 
Moreover their evidences show that only larger undercapitalized banks have reallocated their 
credit away from riskier firms, while this “flight to quality” has not occurred for smaller less-
capitalized institutions. 
                                                          
15 Funds will be collected gradually to reach a target level of 1% of covered deposits by 1st January 2024. 
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1.5.2 The increase in Non-performing Loans 
Another consequence of the Financial Crisis and Great Depression, strictly connected with the 
previous one, is the Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) surge. First of all, it should be noted that 
the relevance of NPLs in the recent crisis is not surprising; on the contrary, deteriorated loans 
are a regular feature of several economic and banking crisis (Bholat et al., 2016).  
A fast increase of NPL ratio, both in United States and in the euro area, has been observed 
during the Financial Crisis, nevertheless the trend changed radically from 2010, with an 
efficient resolution of the problem in the USA while Euro area banks continued to hoard bad 
debts (see Figure 2). Since 2015 also in the EU the situation is slowly improving as the 
average NPL ratio decreased from 6.4% in December 2014 to 5.7% in March 2016; however 
this level remains up to three times higher than other global jurisdictions (EBA, 2016). 
Figure 2: The evolution of NPL ratios in Europe and in the US 
 
Source: Mesnard et al., 2016. 
 
It is important to emphasize that, since the start of the crisis, the deterioration of assets’ 
quality was very irregular across Member States. Significant differences can be observed in 
term of: 
 NPL ratio, that fluctuates both according to countries and to size of the institution. Across 
countries it varies from 1% for Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden to value above 40% in 
financial distressed states (Cyprus and Greece)16; simultaneously small and medium 
banks account higher NPL ratio than large banks and GSIBs. 
                                                          
16 All point-in time data are reported as of March 2016. 
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 Coverage ratio, that differs significantly across states ranging from only 30% to 67%; in 
addition the group of small banks reports lower coverage ratios in comparison with the 
others. 
 Finally also in terms of sectors the NPL ratio differs across countries, although there is a 
common trend towards higher NPL ratios for SMEs in comparison with large corporates 
and households. 
On the other hand a comparison of NPLs’ levels between countries is challenging (if not 
impossible) since, until recently, there was no common definition across states. This gap, at 
least at the EU level, has been recently closed with the adoption of a harmonised definition17 
of NPLs by the EBA, compulsory since September 2014. Only in 4 out of the 28 European 
Union countries there are still national definitions of NPL that differ from the one envisaged 
by EBA. 
 
Impact of NPLs on credit and economic growth 
Persistently high levels of NPLs constitute a major problem that must be addressed since they 
slow down credit growth and, as a consequence, they endanger economic activity. 
According to Aiyar et al. (2015) high levels of bad loans reduce bank profitability due to the 
higher provisions required and they boost risk perception on part of investors. Additionally 
NPLs, even net of provisions, tie up significant amount of capital as a result of the higher risk. 
In other words banks filled of bad debts set up higher lending rates, reduce lending volumes 
and cope with higher funding costs. They also estimate a robust relationship between higher 
NPLs and weaker credit supply and GDP growth.  
Furthermore their analysis suggest that a reduction of NPLs could make available for 
European banks a sizable amount of capital (€54 billion), enough to support new lending up 
to  €553 billion18. 
To conclude a more energetic credit growth is vital for SMEs (that are more dependent on 
bank financing), it should reduce the private sector debt overhang problem and it may 
enhance monetary policy transmission (Mesnard et al., 2016). 
 
                                                          
17 A briefly explanation is provided later in the second Chapter (Box 1). 
18 Assuming NPL are reduced to their historical average of 3-4% (as percent share of total loans) and sold at 
their net book value (that is with no haircut). Instead with haircuts larger than 5% (on net book values) the 
freed-up capital could be negative for some countries. 
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Determinants of NPLs 
Trends in NPLs, and more generally in credit quality, clearly depend on group-management 
decision (e.g. poor lending), but they are also affected by the general economic conditions in 
the markets where institutions operate. In fact, there is a vast empirical literature than 
confirms the interaction between the macroeconomic conditions and asset quality.  
The research of Beck, Jakubik and Piloiu (2013) investigates the determinants of NPLs using 
data from a sample of 75 countries in the decade before the financial crisis. Their empirical 
evidences confirm the hypothesis that the drop in real GDP growth during the crisis was the 
largest driver for the increase of NPLs. 
Moreover they found additional factors that tend to increase NPLs. According to their results 
an exchange rate depreciation have a great impact on countries with specific vulnerabilities, 
and also a decline of stock prices and a rise in lending interest rates tend to increase NPLs. 
The last two factors appear to be statistically significant although relative moderate in size. 
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CHAPTER 2. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE NPLs PROBLEM 
 
2.1 A Comprehensive Strategy 
As stated in the last part of the first chapter the level of NPLs in some economies is still high 
with respect to pre-crisis ratios. The problem is of high relevance especially in some part of 
Europe, i.e. in the southern part of the euro area as well as in some south-eastern European 
countries (sees Figure 3). To tackle this problem several strategies has been developed, both 
for the Europe as a whole as well as for the single countries experiencing highest difficulties. 
Figure 3: Gross NPLs ratio in Europe after the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Source: Aiyar et al., 2015. 
 
The build-up of large volumes of bad loans is in part due to the sluggish economic recovery 
but structural obstacles, e.g. underdeveloped distressed debt markets and shortages in 
supervisory and legal frameworks, cause at least a part of the persistency. 
Additionally there is not only a main problem (e.g. an underdeveloped market for distressed 
debt) but on the contrary there are several structural obstacles interrelated between them, for 
this reason a comprehensive approach is crucial. 
A recent Staff discussion Note of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has investigated the 
main obstacles to the NPL resolution in Europe and, based on these, has developed a 
“Comprehensive NPL Resolution Strategy” (Aiyar et al., 2015). The survey focused on 
European countries with high NPLs levels and clustered difficulties into five general areas: 
supervisory framework, legal system, distressed debt markets, informational shortcomings 
and the tax regime. 
24 
 
Problem in the legal framework and underdeveloped distressed debt markets are deemed as 
the most severe obstacles, furthermore the different obstacles are interlinked (there is a sort of 
compounding effect) and the scores of the other three difficulties are not significantly lower. 
As expected higher score, i.e. greater severity, of obstacles is associated with worse NPL 
outcomes. 
Aiyar et al. (2015), looking at the lessons from past international experiences, suggest that an 
efficient strategy for the European context have to be implemented as soon as possible and 
should be a comprehensive one, i.e. combine three key elements: a more robust supervision, 
institutional reforms to the insolvency regimes and the development of a distressed debt 
market (Figure 4). 
To enhance effectiveness these three core measures should be backed by some support 
actions, e.g. reforming the tax regime in areas where creditors are discouraged from 
provisioning or writing off loans; enhancing access to debtor’s information; revisiting the 
privileged role of public creditors19; and through advisory services to made debtors more 
aware of their options and comfortable to discuss them with creditors. 
Figure 4: NPLs, Causes and Solutions 
 
Source: Aiyar et al., 2015. 
 
                                                          
19 The priority of public creditor’s claims can pose collective actions problems, e.g. discourage banks from 
restructuring distressed debtors. This is compounded by lack of coordination between private and public 
creditors. 
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Supervisory policies 
An effective supervisory policy should first pursue a conservative application of accounting 
standards in such a way a more vigorous provisioning, fast write-offs and income recognition 
is encouraged. Second, it should ensure that banks apply a firm approach to collateral 
valuation, i.e. reflecting variations in market conditions, the cost of sale, and the time 
necessary to realize the proceeds. Third, assets disposal should be pushed through a 
reinforcement of capital requirements, for example with time-bounds targets and increasing 
risk weights for “aged” impaired assets.  
Another measure, to address asset quality problems proactively, for banks with NPLs 
exceeding a set threshold, could be an enhanced oversight regime through detailed reporting 
requirements and the development of internal NPL management unit defining rules and work 
practices for NPL resolution20. Finally supervisory authorities should encourage full 
disclosure to increase market transparency and discipline, and must review their sanctioning 
power, often underdeveloped for NPL oversight. 
Legal framework 
The European authorities’ reform process should aims at the creation of an effective 
insolvency regime. Fundamentally it should arrange an adequate number of resolution toolkit 
ranging from rehabilitation (for viable but distressed firms) to effective liquidation (for no 
more viable firms), also through out-of-court agreements. 
As a complement, an effective institutional setting is necessary, as slow and inefficient court 
proceedings can jeopardize even a good insolvency regime. For example in some cases 
countries do not set strict time limits for the insolvency process (or if existing are regularly 
not respected), incentive for insolvency practitioners to speed up liquidation are often not 
developed enough and there are no specialized judges to deal with commercial or insolvency 
issues. All this aspects lead to a considerably variation across countries for debt enforcement 
and foreclosures both in term of speed and rate of recovery. 
Recently, many European countries have improved their insolvency regimes in line with these 
suggestions and international best practices; on the other hand reforms have been irregular 
across states. 
 
 
                                                          
20 Despite most banks tend to have dedicated NPL divisions they lack the expertise, capacity and tools to deal 
with large amounts of bad loans.  
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Distressed debt markets 
The market in Europe for distressed debt is relative small both compared with the outstanding 
stock of NPLs and with peer countries. Therefore the last part of the strategy suggested by the 
IMF to facilitate the removal of NPLs is to foster the development of such markets21. These 
markets suffer from various structural shortcomings greatly contributing to the large price 
gaps between potential buyers and sellers. Some deficiencies are related to incomplete and not 
timely updated credit information on borrowers, overvalued and not liquid collaterals, low 
recovery values and inadequate provisioning of NPLs. 
Distressed asset disposals in the past had mixed results and usually took place via portfolio 
sales, securitization or with transfer to private or public Bad Bank. The various alternatives 
are discussed later on this chapter, devoting also some attention at the compatibility between 
(public) Asset Management Companies, State Aid Rules and the recent BRRD. 
 
2.2 Creating value through divestitures 
Before investigate different possibilities to cope with NPLs, it is worthwhile to review first 
some general evidences about divestitures and then focus on the banking sector. 
From a wider perspective a portfolio of businesses is value-creating if the company is 
currently the “best owner” for each business of the portfolio. An owner could qualifies as the 
best for a specific industry if he could add value through unique links with other businesses or 
through better governance, influencing critical stakeholders, if he has distinctive skills (both 
functional or managerial) or insight and foresight from which the new business can benefit. 
The definition of best owner is not static; on the contrary it varies over time as circumstances 
change. Unsurprisingly the skills needed to create value in any single business unit renovate 
as the unit evolves and, since company’s core competencies are relative fixed, only few 
corporation can efficiently manage a business unit across all the life cycle. Hence, applying 
the best owner principle, corporations should “continually look for and acquire companies 
where they could be the best owner, and must divest businesses where they used to be the best 
owner but that another company could now own better” (Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2015; 
pp. 418-419). 
                                                          
21 A liquid distress debt market could be a more cost-effective alternative to internal NPL management, 
especially for smaller banks that often lack the necessary competences and resources to manage NPLs. 
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The steps to exploit the entire potential value of a portfolio of businesses can be summarized 
as in the Figure 5 and they include improvement of operations internally, divestitures, 
acquisition and possible changes in the capital structure. 
 
Figure 5: Steps in Constructing a Portfolio of Businesses 
 
Source: Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2015. 
 
Therefore any value creating strategy should focus not only on acquisitions or internal 
improvements but also on a periodically portfolio’s cleaning out strategy. 
The right mix also varies across the business lifecycle, Brandimarte, Fallon and McNish 
(2001) analysis suggests that the strategy should be more weighted toward acquisitions in the 
first phases (build and expand) while for business in the last segments of the lifecycle (operate 
and reshape) the best plan is a more balanced program of acquisitions and divestitures.  
Focusing on divestitures only, they are commonly classified in two main categories: private 
(trade sale and joint venture) and public transactions (initial public offering, carve-out and 
spin/split-off). The first category is particularly suitable when the candidates (better owners) 
can be clearly identified. 
In general the choice depends on several aspects. Among the others an important role is 
played by the availability of strategic or financial buyers, by the need to collect cash and as a 
result of the need of holding some level of control during the first steps of the procedure. 
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From a pure seller perspective a divestiture creates value when someone else is willing to pay 
a price that exceeds the seller’s estimated value of the business or asset. In other words a 
comparison between costs and benefits of holding a business is necessary. The main costs 
could be classified into costs to the parent, costs to the unit and depressed exit prices. The first 
one concerns incompatibilities between the parent and the unit “culture”, the absorption of a 
sizable share of scarce management time in an inefficient way and cross-subsidization 
between branches that could leads to not optimal decisions. The second is mainly related to 
the parent’s lack of core capabilities needed to manage the business efficiently, at different 
moment in the lifecycle. Finally hold on seriously underperforming businesses too long could 
bring down the value of the entire organization (Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2015). 
Academic researches provide numerous evidences for divestitures’ potential to create value, 
both in the short term when announced and either in the long term. Among the others 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) studied the announcement effect of acquisitions and divestitures 
during the 1990s providing evidences that both acquisitions and divestitures increase wealth 
and that those effects are correlated to the size of the restructuring proposal. 
Meanwhile a McKinsey study of some of the largest US companies22 provided some 
interesting evidences about the impact of divestitures over a longer period. The least active 
one third of the sample, i.e. companies implementing a passive portfolio approach with no 
divestitures or that sold business only under pressure, significantly underperformed 
companies with an active portfolio approach. Indeed, over the ten-year period analysed, active 
companies achieved a thirty percent higher total return to shareholders in comparison with 
corporations implementing passive M&A strategies. Finally, focusing only on active 
companies, those that pursued a balanced strategy obtained higher return than those that 
primarily divested or acquired only (Brandimarte, Fallon and McNish, 2001). 
Furthermore Mauboussin and Callahan (2014) show that most of the value of a typical 
company is created by a relative small percentage of their assets, this means that corporations 
have businesses or assets not earning the cost of capital and that may be more valuable for 
someone else. Therefore owners could increase their company values even if the scale of their 
operations has been reduced through the so called “addition by subtraction”. Also, on average, 
be a seller is better than be a buyer since evidences shows that M&A overall create value but 
the acquirers fight to capture much, if any, of that value. 
                                                          
22 They used a sample of 200 companies and examined all their acquisitions and divestitures in one decade 
(from 1990 to 2000). 
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Nevertheless managers often mistakenly consider divestitures as a synonym of failure. Most 
of the sales are reactive rather than be proactive and systematic, this means that executives 
tend to divest only in reaction to pressures from outside and often postpone the trades for too 
much time, i.e. divest only after the business has been underperforming for many years. 
The underdeveloped role actually played by divestitures is in part caused by the belief that a 
dilution of corporate earnings occurs. Indeed it is true but, as long as another part is willing to 
pay more than the value estimated by the parent company, the divestiture is value creating and 
should be executed. 
Additionally some practical challenges may complicate the decision to divest (how and 
when). Some difficulties could arise in the presence of synergy benefits since part of them 
could be lost; shared assets, services or systems carriage similar issues. Moreover legal, 
contractual and regulatory barriers should be taken into account as well, since they can 
significantly slow down the process. 
A final remark looks at market conditions. Market value is generally consistent with the 
fundamental value in the long term but deviations could occur in the short term so possible 
value gaps have to be considered; for example many companies cancelled their divestments 
plans completely during the financial crisis. Obviously the more liquid a market is the better 
the sale price is expected to be (Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2015).  
Additionally both acquisitions and divestitures tend to occur in waves, i.e. a lot of divestitures 
occur during recession while a lot of M&A are made during moments of euphoria, but they 
should be ultimately driven by the core factors explained before and not by external forces. In 
other words the timing is a key factor for maximize the value of the operation. 
 
2.3 Divestitures in the banking sector 
The bulk of the evidences reported before could be well applied to the banking sector, taking 
into account its special characteristics. Banks are a particular category of financial 
intermediaries with the power to exercise the banking activity, reserved to banks only. 
But what does banking activity mean? Banking activity could be defined as the simultaneous 
action of collecting savings from the public (depositors) and that of granting loans to 
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borrowers. In addition to this, banks can exercise any other financial activity, following the 
proper discipline, and other related and instrumental activities (Art. 10, TUB23).  
The first step is to define what banks should divest. At a first glance, since one of the main 
activities of financial institutions is to grant loans to borrowers then, divesting should mainly 
imply to off-load NPLs and only residually other categories of assets.  
However this definition is broad and rely on a specific type of bank, indeed it works smoothly  
for a commercial bank with an “originate-to-hold” model, i.e. financial institutions where 
loans account for an high percentage of overall assets and that kept mortgages on their 
balance sheets until maturity (hereafter also called “classical banking business”). 
Different financial institutions may have different objectives. Investment and universal banks, 
having a lower percentage of loans over total assets, have clearly complete different 
divestitures strategies, less focused on bad loans and more dedicated to the divestitures of 
non-core activities or units were they used to be the best owner.  
Likewise over time, and with the introduction of new technologies, a lot of commercial banks 
evolve toward a more “originate-to-distribute” model, i.e. selling securitized loans before the 
maturity. In this way banks greatly reduced credit risk and curbed the rise of NPLs, on the 
other hand this behaviour spread the credit risk among numerous subjects and, as already 
mentioned, it was one of the roots of the financial crisis. 
In the remaining part of our analysis the focus will be mainly on the disposal of NPLs and not 
on the divestitures of other non-core assets or business. This choice is motivated by the great 
attention devoted to NPLs since the start of the financial crisis. Indeed they are still perceived 
as one of the major problem for the banking system (especially in the southern part of the euro 
area as well as in some other south-eastern countries) and they are considered as one of the 
key priorities for ECB banking supervision (ECB, 2016).  
NPLs do not generate interest income, nonetheless due to write-downs and legal and 
administrative costs they have a strong impact on earnings ratios, i.e. banks have to cope with 
a significant profitability problem. Moreover, as already mentioned in the first chapter, high 
levels of NPLs are negative related with lending and GDP growth. Finally, due to additional 
capital requirements for high-risk weighted asset, NPLs tie-up relevant amount of capital. 
To tackle the NPLs problem several measures have been undertaken at the European Union 
level.  
                                                          
23 Testo unico delle leggi in materia bancaria e creditizia (Consolidated Law on Banking). 
31 
 
The first relevant regulatory change is the introduction of a new set of banking standards 
(Basel III)24 aimed at gradually strengthens financial institutions.  
The main improvements are the introduction of higher capital requirements and capital 
buffers, the set-up of a leverage ratio with the intention of limit the build-up of leverage in the 
banking sector, and the arrangement of liquidity ratios to improve the funding position both in 
the short term25 and in the medium/long term.  
The second is the response of the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) to the 
financial crisis, completed in July 2014, with the introduction of a new accounting standard 
the “IFRS 9 Financial Instruments” (replacing the previous IAS 39) that will come into effect 
on January 2018. The new accounting principle is expected to enhance investor confidence in 
bank’s balance sheets through the improvements introduced, e.g. with the introduction of a 
new definition of impaired assets and of a new expected-loss impairment model that will 
require a more timely recognition of estimated credit losses (IFRS, 2014). 
One more important step forward is represented by the ECB’s Draft guidance to banks on 
non-performing loans, currently non-binding, identifying a number of best practices useful to 
cope the problem throughout the all the life cycle of NPL (ECB, 2016). The ECB’s focus on 
this issue is not new, indeed it began in 2014 with the Comprehensive Assessment, a financial 
health check to ensure that banks can survive possible financial shocks and are sufficiently 
capitalised. 
Furthermore, as already mentioned, the EBA has released a new forbearance and non-
performing exposures definition which applies to all loans and debt securities that are on-
balance-sheet. Both these definitions are compulsory26 for all the European banks since 
September 2014 and a briefly explanation of them is reported inside the box in the next page 
(Box 1). 
In that period the EBA was concerned by a general trend of deteriorating asset quality across 
Europe and by the extensive use of forbearance, potentially aiming at delaying loss 
recognition and hiding asset quality deterioration. To assess and solve these criticalities a 
comparable and harmonised definition was a necessary prerequisite, however at that time 
                                                          
24 Since standards proposed by the Basel Committee have not legal power, the implementation in the European 
Framework has been made through the Capital Requirements Directive IV (Directive 2013/36/EU) and the 
Capital Requirements Regulation (Regulation EU 575/2013), the so called “CRD IV package”. 
25 It is worth recalling that during the crisis a number of banks suffered liquidity problems due to the excessive 
reliance on short term inter-banking fund. 
26 The implementation has been made with the Commission implementing regulation (EU) No 680/2014, later 
revised by the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/227 of 9 January 2015. 
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national practices differ and there were no coherent definitions. This lack of homogeneity has 
pushed the EBA toward the implementation of a harmonised definition (EBA, 2014). 
For the same reasons also the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in July 2016 
published a guideline with their definition of NPEs and forbearance (BIS, 2016). 
Box 1 
EBA’s newly harmonised definitions of NPEs and Forbearance 
According to the EBA, Forborne Exposures are defined as debt contracts in respect of which 
forbearance measures have been applied, i.e. concessions towards a debtor that is experiencing 
or close to experience difficulties in meeting its financial commitments. A concession may 
entail a loss for the lender and refers to a modification of the previous terms and conditions of a 
contract or to a total or partial refinancing of a troubled debt contract that would not have been 
granted had the debtor not been experiencing financial difficulties. Forbearance does not 
necessarily mean non performing, indeed forborne exposures can be recognized both in the 
non-performing and in the performing portfolios. 
The definition of Non-Performing Exposure is based on the four following criteria: 
a) Entry criteria: a non-performing exposure is every exposure that is 90 days past‐due or 
unlikely to pay without collateral realisation, even if it is not recognised as defaulted or 
impaired. In any case exposures in respect of which a default is considered to have 
occurred and exposures that have been found impaired in accordance with the applicable 
accounting framework shall always be considered as NPEs. 
b) Pull effect: all exposures to a debtor have to be considered non‐performing when its on‐
balance sheet 90 days past‐due reaches 20% of the outstanding amount of total on‐
balance sheet exposure to that debtor. 
c) Exposures cease to be non-performing if all the following conditions are satisfied: the 
exposures meet the exit criteria for the discontinuation of the impairment and default 
classification, the situation of the debtor has improved to the extent that full repayment is 
likely to be made, and the debtor does not have any amount past-due by more than 90 
days. 
d) Additionally NPE that are forborne cannot exit the NPE classification before one year 
over which the debtor has to prove its ability to meet the restructured conditions, even if 
forbearance has led to the exit from default or impairment classes (Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/227). 
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Thus, from a wider perspective, we have four different definitions of exposures that are no 
more performing. The first two, almost identical, are the already mentioned supervisory 
definition of “NPEs” developed by the EBA and the one developed by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, the third is the prudential definition of “default” set up in the Capital 
Requirement Regulation (Art 178), and the last one is the accounting definition of “impaired” 
provided by the IAS 39 (now IFRS 9). 
Although the last two categorizations are slightly different in comparison with the first pair, in 
most cases the concepts are aligned. Every impaired and every defaulted exposure by 
definition is necessarily a NPE, but the converse could not be true since NPE is a relative 
broader concept and could potentially incorporate other exposures.  
The main drivers of the potential differences are the extent in which automatic factors used in 
NPE are not envisaged by the other two definitions, i.e. NPE classification due to the 20% 
pulling effect and one year period to exit NPE category (ECB, 2016). 
Some other actions mainly aimed at improving national insolvency systems have been 
introduced by single member states, consistently with the recommendations of the 
“Comprehensive Strategy” developed by the IMF. 
Indeed recently European banks have put significant effort and resources to reduce the pile of 
NPLs in line with the suggestions and provisions of regulators and of many other institutions 
(mainly IMF, ECB and EBA). In this regard is useful to remember that since the starting of 
the financial crisis European banks are facing a drive on the road to the reduction of the size 
of their balance sheet, primarily through sales of non-core assets. The main reason is the 
already mentioned strong pressure toward the increase of capital ratios. This behaviour is 
consistent with the common belief that divestitures are a synonym of failure and that they 
happen mainly in reaction to outside pressures.  
Nevertheless in some countries NPL stocks are still much higher than pre-crisis level and a lot 
more needs to be done in the next future both for reduce stocks and new flows of NPLs.   
In the first part of the chapter the focus was more general and centred on the actions that 
regulators should undertake. Now the emphasis is more on the improvement required at the 
bank level. At this level NPL management require a proactive and rigorous approach. 
A well-structured plan to manage NPL stocks begins with an assessment of the operating 
environment. After that through a number of steps a NPL plan, establishing strategic targets 
both in terms of development of operational capabilities and projected NPL reductions over a 
defined time horizon, can be formed. The plan must then be implemented and results should 
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be evaluated and matched with initial targets with the aim to refine the strategies and, if 
necessary, take corrective actions (Alvarez & Marsal, 2016; ECB, 2016). 
A complete assessment of the operating environment includes three main valuations. The first 
one concern an analysis of the internal capabilities to effectively manage and reduce NPLs, at 
the end the bank should determine strengths, significant gaps and area of improvements. 
Subsequently an analysis of the external conditions and operating environment is 
fundamental: the external factors that should be taken into account are macroeconomic 
conditions, market expectations, NPL investor demand, and the regulatory, legal and judicial 
framework. Finally also the capital implication of the plan, ideally under different economic 
scenarios, should be considered. 
The next stage looks at the development and implementation of the strategy. It should not 
include only a single option, but rather a combination of different strategies to best achieves 
the targets over the different time horizons and over different portfolios or segments. From a 
continuum of solutions we can outline two main approaches: internal recovery and external 
routes, where the first one also acts as a reserve plan if the exit option is not feasible or fail. 
The development of internal work-out strategies involves the definition of a certain number 
of realistic and regularly updated targets for each relevant class of exposure; e.g. expected 
long term NPL level, expected recovery rate, potential losses and expected timelines for 
recovery. The various steps can be handled completely internally, through non-core NPL unit, 
or can be outsourced (even partially). In the first case actions on NPLs can be taken in the 
court (legal recovery) or out of the court (consensual recovery). 
External recovery means sale of loan portfolios to external specialized companies, use of 
hybrid strategies (work-out of loans with enhancement potential internally for a specified time 
followed by sale or outsourcing) and resort to more structured solutions like Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPVs, also called Bad Banks). In each case the ultimate exit scheme will depends 
not only on the bank’s optimal strategy but also on constrains and external factors. 
Table 1 briefly summarizes the advantages and considerations of the various possibilities. 
Starting from the lowest level of externalization NPLs can be retained and managed by banks. 
This approach could be proficient if the bank has a sufficient level of knowledge and expertise 
to effectively tackle the issues. Moreover it requires suitable incentive schemes and the 
availability of sufficient funds to support restructuring when necessary. If all these conditions 
are fulfilled, i.e. an efficient recovery system has been implemented; there is the potential for 
high recovery. 
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Internal actions on NPLs can then be taken in or out the court. The first is based on 
insolvency and liquidation processes, in-court restructuring schemes and legal recovery 
through enforcement of underlying collateral, also without the cooperation of the debtor. 
The second one is centered on consensual recovery and mainly consists on forbearance 
measures like loans’ restructuring with new terms or new lending, cash settlement with the 
borrower’s consent and on out of the court restructurings. 
The strengths of legal recovery are the set-up of a binding framework and the higher degree of 
certainty in developed markets. At the same time legal costs, potential uncertainty outcome in 
less developed markets and long time to execution should be considered since they can 
greatly reduce the recoverable amount.  
The main advantages of consensual recovery are the avoidance of costly legal process and the 
shorter time required for the implementation that leads to more cost-efficient process and with 
the potential for high recovery. Anyway funding requirements in form of new lending, in case 
of restructuring, and time to execution should be taken into account. 
For both approaches the bank needs an adequate extent of skilled staff and appropriate 
incentive schemes (Alvarez & Marsal, 2016). 
The recourse to external solutions is unavoidable when the bank believes to be not able to 
manage all the NPEs internally or lacks some core skills. 
The first alternative is to outsource part of the management to external specialized companies 
or to form a joint venture with third parties, although retaining the majority and therefore the 
governance of the work out unit. These strategies are suitable if the institution lacks core 
skills. At the same time they allow free-up management time but are time consuming to be 
implementing. 
A more incisive option, i.e. with a higher degree of externalization, is to relocate or sold bad 
loans to specialized loan companies. Besides free-up management time, with this choice 
banks can also improves liquidity position and potentially pick-up capital ratios. Nonetheless 
the sales of NPLs imply an immediate crystallisation of losses that could be particularly 
relevant if the price gap between market value and book value is high. 
Moreover, managing the stock of NPL is only half of the story. Addressing the flow of new 
NPEs is as important as managing the stock: eradicate the past consistencies without 
addressing the underlying problems is not really helpful, as the stock will rise again and again 
due to the new flows of bad loans. 
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Though NPL flow highly depends on general economic conditions, an important role is also 
played by management decisions. Therefore the development of strong underwriting policies 
and guidelines, continuously reviewed and updated on the basis of “best practice” is crucial.  
Table 1: Internal VS External Solutions 
 Advantages Considerations 
IN
T
E
R
N
A
L
 
S
O
L
U
T
IO
N
S
 
Consensual 
 Potential for high recovery 
 Costly legal process are 
avoided 
 Skilled staff  
 Suitable incentive schemes 
 Funding requirements in case 
of restructuring 
 Time to execution 
Legal 
 Framework for binding 
restructuring and recovery 
 More certainty in developed 
markets 
 Legal costs 
 Uncertainty outcome in less 
developed markets 
 Time to execution 
E
X
T
E
R
N
A
L
 
S
O
L
U
T
IO
N
S
 
Hybrid Strategy / 
Outsourcing 
 Exploit enhancement potential 
 Frees up management time 
 Suitable if bank lacks core 
skills 
 Time to execution 
 Time consuming to implement 
Sale 
 Frees up management time 
 Improves liquidity position 
 Potentially improves of capital 
ratios 
 High Price Gap 
 Quality of portfolio 
 Inadequate provisioning and 
lack of information 
SPV  
(Bad Bank) 
 Diversification effect 
 Potential increases of capital 
ratios and liquidity position 
 Possibility of state intervention 
 Immediate crystallisation of 
losses through asset transfer 
 Time to execution due to 
complexity 
 State Aid rules / BRRD 
Source: own elaboration from Alvarez & Marsal (2016). 
 
 
2.4 Internal management or Externalization? 
Clearly the credit work-out activity should not be treated as stand alone, but as the last phase 
of the entire credit value chain. In other words the whole credit lifecycle should be designed 
in such a way to minimize the probability of deterioration and, if things go wrong with the 
debtor, to ensure an optimal collection of the residual value. The three central phases of loan 
lifecycle are the credit origination, the credit management, and the credit collection and 
recovery. 
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During the origination phase the bank collects all the relevant information on the counterpart 
asking for a loan. The creation of a reliable database is essential; therefore a correct 
management of this phase involves getting information efficiently and effectively about the 
debtor and about the contractual arrangement of the mortgage. After that the financial 
institution must determine the specific risk of the loan, the estimated losses and the associate 
provisions. According to the Basel III Accord, the bank can choose among three different 
approaches (standardized, foundation, and advanced internal rating based) each one with a 
different grade of complexity. 
With the standardized approach no internal discretionary actions are needed, while the other 
two requires the estimation of some parameters in order to assess the counterparty risk.  
Under the foundation approach the financial institution has to estimate the probability of 
default (PD) of any single loan while the “formula” and other relevant parameters are 
provided by the banking supervisor.  
The advanced IRB approach instead is the most complex since the bank must estimate not 
only the PD but also the exposure at the moment of default (EAD) and the loss given default 
(LGD), on the other hand its application usually results in lower capital requirements. 
Once the credit has been originated the next phase is to manage it. Information about the 
status of a credit should be regularly collected and updated since the credit can take a 
multitude of possible patterns and the bank must be ready to react. For this reason each bank 
should institute a limited number of early warning signals (EWS) allowing for a timely 
determination of any possible deterioration. 
Depending on the development of the loans itself the final phase of the credit lifecycle can 
either be its full collection or its partial recovery if the counterpart defaulted. Anyhow the 
declaration of default is not immediate, indeed if an obligor fails to repay its debt within the 
contractual terms the loan is considered past-due (or sub-performing) and a number of actions 
take place before the relocation into the NPLs category (Scardovi, 2016). 
In any case a clear separation between the units originating the loans and the unit managing 
the NPLs is recommended in order to avoid potential conflict of interest. Moreover the 
division should be set-up in such a way to take into account the full NPL life cycle from the 
beginning to the end.  
The first relevant phase in an hypothetic life cycle of NPLs is the management of early arrears 
(up to 90 days past due) but not yet classified as non-performing, at this stage the focus 
should be on collecting the information necessary for a comprehensive valuation of the 
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borrower’s status to determine the most appropriate work-out strategy. Financial actions can 
be taken to minimize the exposure at the time of the potential future default and on the other 
side to reduce the borrower’s probability of default, e.g. the bank should seek options to 
strengthen its position and could grant short-term forbearance agreements.  
The following stage consists on the formalization and implementation of restructuring and 
forbearance arrangements with the borrowers. These concessions should be carried out only 
when the previous assessment concluded that viable restructuring options exists and in each 
case should be subject to an enhanced monitoring for a defined period. 
Another phase, which takes place in parallel with the previous one, focuses on borrowers for 
which no viable forbearance solutions are available. In these cases, banks should perform a 
cost-benefit analysis of the different liquidation options, choose the best one and speedily 
proceed with it as soon as the loan reaches the non performing status (ECB, 2016). 
Once the loan reaches the non-performing status the focus moves from the minimization of 
the PD and of the EAD to the minimization of the LGD. At this point, since the possibility of 
recovery to a performing status is low (especially for the worst NPLs categories), the bank 
must plan and execute its work out activities in order to try to recovery as much value as 
possible from the loan.  
In doing this a financial institution can decide to manage the non performing exposure 
through an internal division, or as an alternative, can consider the externalization of this task 
to third party servicers.  
The choice between internal and external strategy is not trivial, it is based on a strategic 
assessment of the bank’s internal capabilities but also on the economic conditions as during 
recessions financial institutions may end up owing too big amount of bad loans that cannot be 
all efficiently managed.  
A homogeneous and unfocussed management of NPLs would have a negative effect on the 
workout process because it would lack both of efficiency and of effectiveness. Indeed 
effective NPL strategies always require a segmentation of portfolios to obtain group of 
borrowers with similar characteristics and requiring analogous treatments. 
Clearly the more granular the segmentation, the more accurate the other steps will be. The 
first distinction is between “common” lending and leasing. In fact the bank is already the 
direct owner of the underlying asset being financed in the case of leasing, but this is not true 
for all the remaining assets. After this first segmentation has been done, additional separation 
could be introduced to further clusters NPL portfolios.  
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There are numerous ways to segment loans: the main drivers could be the kind of counterpart, 
the size of the exposure, the age, the presence of guarantee or collateral and the location.  
For the leasing book the clusters are similar, e.g. the size, the vintage and the type and nature 
of “collateral”. The kind of asset associated to a leasing contract is very important.  
Indeed the big variability among collateral is critical for the bank. It could be an asset that has 
no dynamic secondary market or even in the case of a more standard good it could lose value 
quickly over time. The Figure 6 provides an example of clusterization of banking and leasing 
positions.  
Figure 6: Segmentation of a NPLs portfolio 
 
Source: Scardovi, 2016; p. 30. 
 
For each combination or permutation a detailed analysis, aimed at defining the best recovery 
strategy, should be carried out.  
First of all a feasible overall target recovery rate should be assigned to each cluster. Usually it 
is expressed as a percentage of the gross book value, but a more useful one should also take 
into account the time value of the money recovered. Indeed the net present value is what 
really matters, as it focuses on net cash flows and gives the right weight to the timing. 
The most important decisions, as already explained, concern the choice of the process that 
could be judicial, extrajudicial or both, and the level of outsourcing wanted. Therefore, after 
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having defined the recovery targets, an appropriate management strategy for each category of 
NPLs should be recognized. For this purpose is important to deal both with a cost-to-income 
maximization and with a maximization of recovery rate. 
Costs can be both fixed and variable. In case of internal management fixed costs are usually 
higher since they include the dedicated bank’s employees, the costs related to the operations 
and the technology owned by the bank for the purpose. Conversely externalization would 
require the bank to pay a variable fee relatively high but usually depending on the 
performance reached by the third party, therefore highly incentivizing the counterparts. At a 
first glance externalization could be desirable since lead to a more flexible cost structure. 
Through a sort of screening process each bank should define the portion of NPLs portfolios to 
manage internally versus the ones to be outsourced. A bank prefers to keep managing 
internally the positions with the highest recovery potential, whilst outsourcing the remaining: 
when the expected recovery rate is not higher enough to cover associated internal costs the 
bank decides to sell the portfolio to a third parties. In turn this second player can manage all 
the leftover position internally or pass over some to a third player, and so on (Scardovi 2016). 
When executing a sale transaction selecting the right portfolios is only half of the story, also 
the preparation plays a critical role both to attract investors and to help to squeeze the “bid-
ask spread” by removing some uncertainties and unknowns in a potential transaction. 
For this purpose is important to understand and take into account investors’ requirements, and 
price is not the only one. For example a high data quality and accuracy is of paramount 
importance, therefore investments in information technologies that allows a higher data 
precision have higher returns on investments. The same considerations apply to collaterals 
valuation (Alvarez & Marsal, 2016).  
Another possible answer to the NPLs problem is the securitization. In the first chapter we 
have already mentioned the unrestrained use of loans’ securitization in the USA starting from 
the last decades. 
The essence of securitization is the process of pooling together a large number of assets and 
the subsequent issuance of prioritized claims against these collateralized pools. As a result is 
possible to transform an illiquid asset into a liquid one, moreover many of the created 
“artificial” tranches are far safer (i.e. have a higher rating) than the average assets in the 
underlying pool (Coval, Jurek and Stafford, 2009).  
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This practice began to be commonly used by banks in the early 2000s when they start to 
pooling thousands of mortgages together, and selling these pools to special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs). SPVs finance the purchases by issuing securities with different seniority, called Asset 
Backed Securities or ABS.   
Even if the securitization of performing loans is more common and much cheaper, the process 
is applied also to group of NPLs. Through securitization the originator bank, as in the case of 
a normal sale, can transfer a part of the credit risk outside, increase the financial resources and 
reduce the management cost. 
Sometimes, in order to reduce the risks for the investors and therefore the required rate of 
return, the originator retains or buy-backs the subordinated tranches; but in this way the bank 
is still burdened by part of the credit risk. 
 
2.5 Transfer to a Bad Bank 
When the size of NPLs reaches too big proportion and all the other strategies seems to be not 
sufficient, the creation of an Asset Management Company (AMC) should be taken into 
account. 
The process usually starts with a perception by management that non-performing loans are 
imposing a no more sustainable burden on the bank. Moreover also external pressures from 
regulators could push toward this solution (Neuberger, 1992). 
Through an AMC or Bad Bank the troubled assets in a bank’s balance sheet can be detached 
from the good ones. The first result is a reduction in the information asymmetries since 
investors can distinguish the healthy part of the institution (the good quality assets’ remaining 
in the good bank) from the troubled one. 
The greater transparency is not the only reason to set up a SPV. Worries about a bank’s 
financial situation hinder its capacity to lend, issue debt and raise additional capital. The 
burden of carrying NPLs encloses also the cost of workout efforts within the bank, which can 
distract loan officers from servicing good loans or developing new business. Moreover a high 
proportion of impaired loans likely encourage stricter scrutiny from regulators, thereby 
imposing additional regulatory costs on the bank (Neuberger, 1992). Other value drivers 
created are the properly aligned incentive systems, the focalization of the skills and the 
managerial talents of the management, the possibility to reduce the overall financial risk by 
sharing the risks with other subjects (diversification effect) and, over a longer period of time, 
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the possible improving of capital ratios and liquidity position for the “good” bank (Scardovi, 
2016). 
The basic idea looks simple; nevertheless in practice there are many organizational and 
structural aspects to be taken into considerations. Indeed the creation of a bad bank is highly 
complex and different features must be considered and detailed since they can affect the 
bank’s liquidity, solvency and overall profitability. 
At first glance bad banks can be classified according to the structure and the ownership. 
Focusing on both the characteristics we can identify, on one side, decentralised AMCs, and on 
the other side centralised AMCs. In the first case the asset management is undertaken by the 
bank itself and this vehicle also tend to be private, even if entities set up by the government to 
deal with the assets from a single bank are possible. Conversely a centralised AMC involves 
only one workout entity with some level of public ownership.  
In general a decentralised solution should be in a better position to resolve NPL problems 
than a centralised tool since it has a relevant informational advantage: banks already have all 
the loan files and institutional knowledge of the borrowers. Moreover banks can provide 
additional financing when needed in the restructuring process and, leaving loans in banks, 
may provide an incentive for recovery and for avoiding future losses by improving approval 
and monitoring procedures. 
Conversely a centralized approach allows exploiting economies of scale (i.e. aggregation of 
scarce work-out skills and resources within one agency), due to larger pool of assets can ease 
their securitization, since breaks links between banks and corporates could potentially 
improve the collectability of loans and allows banks to focus on core business. Moreover the 
entity may be entrusted with special powers to accelerate the loan recovery and bank 
restructuring (Klingebiel, 2000). 
In a 2009 paper, McKinsey & Company recognised different basic models for decentralised 
bad banks and some core design topics that banks need always to take into account in setting 
up a SPV (Figure 7). 
First of all, as in every asset disposal strategy, the asset scope should be well-defined; 
selecting which assets should be transferred to the bad bank and which should be retained by 
the core one. Bad banks are usually set up to manage non-performing loans and sometimes 
non-strategic assets, i.e. whatever banks want to dispose in order to deleverage or resize its 
business model. 
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Another crucial step is the selection of the most suitable structure. Individual bad banks 
solutions can be clustered into four basic structures, determined by the combination between 
the legal structure  (which can be a structured solution or the creation of a separate banking 
entity) and the level of deconsolidation from the balance sheet (on-balance sheet vs off-
balance sheet solutions). 
On-balance sheet operations involve a low level of deconsolidation, are faster and simpler to 
implement but they result in only limited risk transfer. 
Structured solutions usually involves the use of guarantee, typically from the government, to 
protect a fraction of the portfolio against losses, still the attractiveness of this solution is 
limited by the lack of a clear asset separation. This disadvantage can be overcome with the 
creation of an internal and separate restructuring unit. While this solution still lacks efficient 
risk transfer, it increases transparency on the core bank’s performance. 
Off-balance sheet actions involves a higher complexity level but at the same time an efficient 
risk transfer and a certain degree of protection. Structured solutions implicate the transfer of 
some portfolios into a special purpose entity, which is then ideally removed from the core 
bank balance sheet. A more effective solution is to dispose the assets into a legally separated 
entity, i.e. perform a bad bank spin-off. 
Figure 7: Core design topics for establishing a bad bank 
 
Source: McKinsey & Company, 2009. 
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After that, to maximize the value’s extraction, is important to define and pursue an optimal 
portfolio run-down strategy. There are basically three main techniques for extracting value 
from the assets: a mere passive rundown; implement sale or securitization of selected assets, 
and set up a work-out on balance sheet trying to accelerate the recovery by actively managing 
the assets.  
Large centralized AMCs, privately held, are rare. When the amount of bad loans and assets 
transferred to the bad bank became significant, it is usually difficult to find an investor willing 
to assume the ownership of such vehicle without asking for a public participation or requiring 
state guarantees to cover the risk for future losses (Klingebiel, 2000). 
During the last financial and economic crisis some euro-area countries set up AMCs to 
address the growing level of NPLs, threatening the financial stability of the entire Eurozone.  
In 2009 the Irish government established the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) 
to address the serious crisis in the Irish banking sector. Similarly, in 2010, the German ones 
set up the FMS Wertmanagement and in November 2012 the “Management Company for 
Assets Arising from the Banking Sector Reorganisation” (Sareb) was created in Spain. 
These three AMCs have some common features but at the same time some dissimilarity. 
Indeed Sareb and NAMA are more similar to each other than between either of them with 
FMS.  
The German AMC was designed as an entirely public AMC and focused on a single 
nationalised banking group, the Hypo Real Estate group, acquiring most of its assets (€ 176.5 
billion, just below 7% of German GDP in 2010). Conversely both Nama and Sareb are 
centralised and were established as majority privately-owned; they both took over assets from 
several domestic banks27. 
The funding strategy of Nama and Sareb was similar: liabilities are made up of a small 
percentage of equity, few subordinated bonds and of a large amount of state-guaranteed senior 
bonds. FMS has a different strategy, by 2011 the original government bonds were replaced by 
FMS’s own funding; bonds can be issued at favourable rates due to a sovereign guarantee. 
                                                          
27 More precisely, according to their respective websites, NAMA acquired assets from 5 participating 
institutions for a gross amount of €74.3 billion (44% of 2009 GDP) while Sareb took over assets from 5 
nationalised banks and from 4 banks that received state funding for an overall gross amount of €107.4 billion 
(10% of 2012 GDP). 
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Moreover all the three AMCs have hired a lot of expert skilled staff with private sector 
experience; but while FMS does its own servicing, NAMA and Sareb commonly outsource 
asset servicing activities (Medina Cas and Peresa, 2016).  
Today the three AMC are at different stages of portfolio disposals and the results are mixed. 
Nama has been very effective, by the end of 2015 it has sold 75% of its assets, redeemed 70% 
of its senior obligations and it is also likely to realize a profit for the Irish state by the time it 
wind down. 
Sareb, having been established only at the end of 2012, is in the early stages of reducing its 
portfolio and repaying senior debt. Moreover Sareb has been loss-making in 2013 and 2014, 
in part due to the slower recovery of market property value in Spain in comparison with 
Ireland and UK. 
FMS has been reasonably successful with the sale of its assets however asset disposal in the 
future will likely be more challenging given the illiquidity and long maturity profile of its 
remaining portfolio (Muehlbronner and Lemay, 2015). 
Some final considerations concern the EU regulatory framework as it strongly influenced the 
extent of some of the Bad Banks established in Europe, especially in countries with high debt 
levels. Moreover, due to recent reforms, the regulatory framework will likely reduce the 
possibility and the convenience to set up state-sponsored bad banks in the future. 
First of all in 2009 Eurostat provided some conditions for SPVs to be classified outside the 
general government sector28 even if they benefit from government guarantees. Even if all the 
conditions are fulfilled such entities would still increase sovereigns’ contingent liabilities. 
Moreover Eurostat also decided to classify capital injections into banks as government 
expenditure (i.e. deficit increasing transfers). Major changes were implemented also in the 
“Eurostat’s European System of National and Regional Accounts” (ESA, 2010), published in 
2013, where a stronger emphasis was put on who is effectively bearing most of the risks 
associated to the bad bank regardless of the AMCs’ ownership structure (Gandrud and 
Hallerberg, 2014). 
Ireland and Spain’s SPV were created to comply with the rules to be classified as a financial 
corporation and the likelihood of building significant losses for the government was mitigated 
mainly by the larger haircut applied to the asset purchased (the average haircut was 57% for 
NAMA and 53% for Sareb). On the other hand, due to the pronounced haircut, the necessary 
                                                          
28 Such entities need to be: majority privately owned, temporary, autonomous in decision-making, acquire 
assets with a substantial haircut and established with the only objective to address financial crisis. 
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recapitalisation of banks led to a consequent increase in general government debts in both 
countries. 
By contrast, the German FMS Wertmanagement was entirely publicly-owned and raised the 
public debt by about 8% of GDP in 2010, but there was no need for recapitalisation of the 
HRE group since FMS acquired assets with no haircut. 
In addition the three AMCs had to comply with EU State-aid regulations when they acquired 
impaired assets from participating banks.  
The transfer price of NPLs is critical in determining the presence and the amount of State aid, 
in general the operation would be State Aid compatible if the transfer price is not higher than 
the real economic value29 as this ensures a level of burden sharing by the banks, since the 
price is set below the book value. 
In the Irish and Spanish case this criteria were respected. Contrariwise, as already mentioned, 
the asset transfer from HRE to FMS exceeded the real economic value as the transfer price 
was equal to the book value. The commission considered also this measure compatible given 
the partial claw back and the in-depth restructuring (Medina Cas and Peresa, 2016). 
As already described in the first chapter, from 2013 the burden sharing requirement was 
further strengthened and a new Resolution Mechanism was established. Moreover due to the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, fully in force since 2016, new measures involving 
State Aid would almost30 automatically trigger the resolution and bail-in of the beneficiary 
banks and the creation of a bad bank is recognised only as one of the resolution tool. 
Bad banks like those created in Spain Ireland and Germany are no more possible under the 
new rules, unless the affected banks are in resolution. However, if an AMC is built with no 
State Aid, then neither bank resolution nor bail-in is required.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 The real economic value corresponds to the net present value of the sum of expected cash flow, discounted 
at an appropriate rate (i.e. the risk-free rate plus a risk premium). It is somewhere between the book value and 
the market value. 
30 The main exception is the Precautionary recapitalisation under Article 32(4)(d) of the BRRD. It is an 
exceptional measure that does not trigger the resolution, on the other hand it is available only for solvent bank 
and when this is necessary to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. These 
recapitalisation measures are conditional on final approval under the European Union State aid framework. 
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CHAPTER 3. AN ANALYSIS OF THE “PRICE GAP” AND OF THE 
EFFECTS ON CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
3.1 The rationale for a better understanding of NPLs’ Price GAP 
In the first Chapter the steep rise in some areas of NPLs, as a consequence of the Financial 
Crisis of 2007-08, has been analysed. Then, in Chapter two a Comprehensive Strategy to 
handle the problem was described and a great level of attention has been devoted to the 
divestitures of Non-Performing Exposures.  
To this end some possible solutions, both internal as well as external, have been presented. 
The choice between internal and external strategies is not trivial; indeed it’s based on a 
thorough evaluation. Likewise the recourse to external solutions could be the only possible 
choice when the amount of NPLs exceeds the bank’s management capacity or when the 
financial institution lacks some core skills. 
During the last financial crisis to overcome these difficulties a number of European banks 
resorted to State Aids and some Asset Management Companies have been set-up. As already 
explained, today measures involving State Aid would almost automatically trigger the 
resolution of the troubled bank, consistently with the BRRD.  
For this reason the transfer of NPLs need to take place at market conditions. At the same time, 
one prerequisite is the existence of a well-developed secondary market. Such markets are 
often underdeveloped and one of the reasons of this failure is the substantial difference 
between the prices offered by investors and the book value of NPLs. This difference is often 
named as “Price GAP” or haircut on the net book value. 
A better understanding of the Price Gap’s determinants and of its effects on Capital Ratios 
could provide some advices for additional measures to reduce the haircut and to improve the 
size of the NPLs’ market. Indeed the bulk of this Chapter focuses on the estimation of the 
Price Gap under different assumptions and on the resulting effects on capital ratios. 
The analysis is based on a sample of Italian banks. Italy is an interesting case study because, 
despite some improvements, remains one of the European countries with the highest level of 
NPLs.  
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According to the last 2016 Risk Dashboard31 published by the European Banking Authority 
the Ratio of NPLs in Italy despite a marginally downward trend is still 15.3%, compared with 
a European average of 5.1%. Only three countries have a higher ratio (see Figure 8).   
Figure 8: Ratio of non‐performing loans and advances (NPL ratio) 
 
Source: EBA Risk Dashboard (data as of Q4 2016), 2017. 
Table 2: Credit quality of Italian banks 
 
Source 1: Bank of Italy, 2017. Financial Stability Report, Number 1/2017. 
                                                          
31 The risk dashboard is based on a sample of Risk Indicators from 189 European banks, so ratio may slightly 
differ from data published by other Authorities, e.g. Bank of Italy. 
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The data reported in the last Financial Stability Report (Table 2) outline a similar situation. 
The gross exposure of NPLs at the end of 2016 was €349 billion (17.3% of customer loans) 
while the net exposure was equal to €173 billion (9.4%). 
Another particular feature of the Italian system is the deep reform process started in the 2015 
with the goal of strengthening the whole banking system. Some of the most important 
initiatives are briefly summarized below. 
In March 2015 the Italian Parliament has approved a decree to reform the governance of 
cooperative banks and few months later a protocol of intent, to foster the self-reform of the 
foundations, was signed between the Association of banking foundations and the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (Garrido et al., 2016). 
The Decree-law 18/2016 (converted into Law 49/2016) moves in the same direction, pushing 
small mutual banks to consolidate under joint-stock holding companies with at list €1 billion  
in equity, in an effort to strengthen the fragmented local banking sector. 
Even more significant are the couple of decree laws32 enacted by the Italian government in 
August 2015 and in May 2016.  
The first one contains a number of measures amending the procedures for firms’ restructuring 
and for the foreclosure of assets. The main adjustments seek to improve the efficiency of the 
existing restructuring tools with the aim of shortening the duration of bankruptcy procedures 
and increase both the survival of debtors and the creditors’ recovery. Other measures include 
a new scheme of restructuring agreement to discourage potential problems generated by 
opportunistic behaviour of creditors’ minorities, as in the previous framework the objection of 
a single creditor might perhaps delay restructuring agreements and end up blocking the rescue 
of still viable corporations. Moreover the reform increases transparency and enhances the 
administrators’ incentives to foster the efficiency and speed of sale proceedings, also through 
the use of electronic processes and staff enhancements (Marcucci et al., 2015). 
The second one, in continuity with the measures adopted in 2015, overall promotes a more 
effective management of NPLs by banks. 
First, it broadened the variety of guarantee tools by adding two new mechanisms: a) a non-
possessory security interest which can be enforced out-of-court in several ways and b) the 
transfer of real property as guarantee for firms, i.e. the so-called “Marcian Pact”. 
                                                          
32 Law Decree No. 83/2015 turned into Law No. 132/2015 and Decree Law 59/2016 converted as amended into 
Law 119/2016. 
50 
 
The change that is expected to have the greatest impact in the short term is the second one; 
under certain conditions it gives to the creditor, should the debtor commit a material breach, 
the right to obtain the ownership of real properties serving as guarantee through an out-of-
court proceeding. Instead through the ordinary enforcement procedure the creditor usually 
obtains the cash amount resulting from the sale of the pledged assets. 
Furthermore it announces the creation of digital register containing information on judicial 
property foreclosures and insolvency proceedings, thus increasing the availability of 
information that can make the valuation of NPLs easier and ultimately contribute to the 
development of a NPLs market. 
Finally additional measures, with respect to those introduced in 2015, to accelerate judicial 
property foreclose procedures, streamline the processes, and improve the probability of selling 
pledged assets have been established (Brodi et al., 2016). 
Together these legal reforms, when fully implemented, are expected to have important effects.  
More efficient and faster foreclosure procedures should reduce the discount required by the 
buyers of NPLs and in the long term should bring down the equilibrium value of the 
NPL/total loans ratio of Italian banks. According to Marcucci et al. (2015) once the new rules 
are fully into force the average length of the bankruptcy process should drop from more than 
six years to around 3 years (or around 4-5 years in a less optimistic scenario) and the overall 
average duration of judicial foreclosures should fall by more than one year, from the 4 years 
before the reforms. Moreover, assuming the complete incorporation of the Marcian Pact in the 
loan agreements, it is realistic to assume that the time needed to transfer real properties will be 
reduced to six months (Brodi et al., 2016). 
Likewise better chances of success for restructuring operations will reduce the inflow of loans 
into the worst quality categories. The system would also benefit from more widespread use of 
digital tools to conduct proceedings and from greater transparency ensured by the single sales 
portal and by the proceedings register. 
At the same time it should be noted that these changes are more effective in curbing the flow 
of NPLs originated from new loans than in dealing with existing stocks. The reason is that 
part of the actions does not affect the already existing contracts, unless they are renegotiated.  
The mentioned reforms are supported by a tool called GACS33, introduced by the Italian 
authorities in the first months of 2016.  
                                                          
33 GACS stands for “Garanzia sulla cartolarizzazione delle sofferenze” and has been introduced by the Law 
Decree No. 18/2016, turned into Law No. 49/2016. 
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Under this mechanism banks can buy a government guarantees for senior tranches of 
securities issued against bad loans, if rated at least as investment grade. Since the insurance is 
priced at market terms and it is based on expected losses, in agreement with the European 
Commission, it does not imply any public support subject to the EU State aid regulations. 
The full impact of the mechanism is not yet completely clear, despite that market participants 
expect it to have a positive but modest impact in closing the “Pricing GAP” by around 2-3 
percentage points  (Jobst and Weber, 2016). 
So far, the use of this tool has been also quite limited, only Banca Popolare di Bari, Banca 
Carige and Creval have resorted to it. Furthermore it expired on 16 August 2017 (18 months 
after its entry into force) but it could be extended up to further 18 months, subject to approval 
by the European Commission.  
Finally, in April 2016, Italy’s largest banks together with nonbank financial institutions and 
banking foundations created a fund called Atlante. The aim was to backstop capital increase 
of banks and purchase non-investment grade tranches of NPL securitizations. 
In the second quarter of 2016 Atlante subscribed the entire capital increase of Banca Popolare 
di Vicenza (for €1.5 billion) and purchased most of the new shares of Veneto Banca after the 
listing to the Italian Stock Exchange was rejected or failed for both banks. 
As a result, the available resources in the Atlante fund significantly dropped and a new fund, 
called “Atlante II” has been created at the end of July 2016. The new fund, differently from 
Atlante, can only invest in NPLs or instruments associated to them. 
One interesting characteristic of the Atlante Fund is its financial objective, achieve a return of 
approximately 6% per annum (i.e. coherent with the IRR of a bond with an average rating of 
approximately single B), significantly lower than the IRR usually planned by specialized 
investors (Quaestio Capital Management SGR S.p.A., 2016). 
On the other hand, to date, the fund activity in the acquisition of junior and mezzanine 
tranches, issued by vehicles set up to acquire portfolios of NPLs, has been rather scarce. 
Moreover the value of the first Atlante fund has recently been reduced of about 80% of 
nominal value due to the zeroing of the value of the owned Veneto banks and, this considered, 
Quaestio Capital Management is evaluating the possibility of liquidating the Fund34. 
                                                          
34 For more information, see the press release of 20 July 2017 available at 
http://www.quaestiocapital.com/sites/default/files/17081%20Red%20391%20ING%20Comunicato%20Stampa
%20Quaestio%20Atlante%20I-II%2020%2007%2017%20%28002%29.pdf 
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3.2 Literature review 
To the best of my knowledge most of the recent literature focused on the causes of NPLs and 
suggested or analysed a number of actions to speed up the resolution. Moreover some other 
studies investigates quantitatively the prospective earnings capacity of Italian banks but not so 
much attention has been paid to the development of a model to estimate the value of NPLs 
and the subsequently effects on Capital Requirements. 
For example Jobst and Weber (2016) estimated the profitability of the 15 largest Italian banks 
under different assumptions. Moreover they also proposed a possible approximation of the 
Price gap to briefly analyse the capital relief and new lending capacity that could arise from a 
decisive NPL disposal, with the purpose of emphasize that higher credit growth is essential to 
improve bank profitability in an environment of declining interest rates. In their research they 
argue that an immediate reduction of NPLs to a level consistent with historical averages 
would not be expected to result in capital relief, since losses would outweigh any potential 
reduction in capital requirements. 
A number of recent studies suggested different measures to resolve the problem of Bad Loans. 
Aiyar et al. (2015) suggested the already mentioned comprehensive strategy to resolve 
Europe’s problem loans. In addition some other researches provided a more tailored country-
specific strategy for Italy. 
Jassaud and Kang (2015) described the situation of NPLs in Italy, then analysed the reasons 
behind the slow pace of NPL Resolution (both on the demand and supply side) and lastly 
advised a number of actions for developing a market for Bad Loans in Italy. 
Factors hindering supply relate to the inadequate incentives for banks to write-off and sell 
NPLs. Indeed the low level of provisioning for bad loans has led to large pricing gaps, 
representing a significant barrier to sales and write-offs. Likewise banks are encouraged to 
hold on highly or fully provisioned loans to boost their overall provisioning coverage ratios. 
Intuitively writing off highly provisioned NPEs reduces the amount of gross loans (i.e. the 
denominator of the coverage ratio) more than the level of provisioning (that is the numerator). 
Conversely if write-offs were not considered the indicator would be possibly underestimated 
since for some written-off loans recovery procedures could still be under way and there is the 
possibility to recover some amounts. 
Other obstacles include the limited capital buffer to absorb additional losses, the unclear 
accounting treatment of the write-offs under IFRS and a tax regime that, until recently, was 
inclined to penalize aggressive provisions and write offs. 
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On the demand side the slow speed of NPLs resolution is mainly due to a lengthy and 
inefficient judicial system that increases the cost of foreclosure and drops the return on NPL, 
and by the lack of a well-developed secondary market. 
Garrido et al. (2016) provided a similar but more exhaustive analysis, including an analysis of 
NPLs by the type of bank, a detailed investigation of the insolvency system and of reform 
options that could further support NPL resolution in Italy. Moreover the paper briefly 
describes the already mentioned set of reforms took by Italian authorities in the last years. 
Shifting for a moment the emphasis on the availability of data, it is worth nothing that pricing 
NPLs is not easy at all. Indeed there is a wide shortage of public, reliable and detailed data on 
NPLs’ sale prices. Furthermore the value largely depends on the characteristics of the single 
portfolio of loans sold, which are not public. 
A reference point for the Italian market might be the transfer price of the bad debts of the four 
resolved banks35. In the provisional assessment the Bank of Italy indicated a weighted “real 
economic value” for bad debts equal to 17.6% of the nominal value (25% for the portion 
backed by mortgages and 8.4% for the unsecured part). Later, in the final assessment made by 
independent experts, the average transfer value was determined to be slightly higher and equal 
to 22.3% (31% for the secured portion and 7.3% for the unsecured one) (Visco, 2016). 
A recent research performed by Ciocchetta et al. (2017), estimated recovery rates using data 
from the Central Credit Register for the period 2006-15. They find that the average recovery 
rates for closed positions sale on the market was 23%, significantly inferior to those closed 
following the internal work-out procedures (47%). 
One recent and significant attempt to better assess the market value of NPLs and therefore the 
Price GAP has been provided by Ciavoliello et al. (2016). They try to investigate the main 
drivers of the substantial difference between the book value and the market value of NPLs. 
According to their proposal the difference is mainly the result of two features or, in other 
words, these two factors alone generate the entire price gap between book and market value. 
The first driver is related to the different discount rate of NPLs’ cash flow. Banks adopting the 
IAS/IFRS accounting principles use the original effective interest rate36 while investors 
demand a much higher rate of return, due to their risk aversion, because they generally have a 
                                                          
35 The resolution procedure has been applied in November 2015 to four small or medium-sized banks all under 
BoI’s special administration (Banca Marche, Banca Popolare dell'Etruria e del Lazio, Cassa di Risparmio di 
Ferrara, and Cassa di Risparmio di Chieti). 
36 The effective interest rate is the rate that exactly discounts estimated future cash payments of the loan (both 
principal and interest) to the amount disbursed inclusive of the costs/revenues attributable to the loan. 
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lower financial leverage than banks and due to the presence of information asymmetries in the 
credit market. Obviously adopting a higher return to discount expected cash flows will results 
in a lower NPL price.  
While the second factor is related to the indirect costs of managing NPLs: banks account for 
them in the financial statement of the year in which they are incurred; contrariwise potential 
buyers deduct them immediately from value, further reducing the purchasing price. 
Moreover Ciavoliello et al. (2016) point out that the price gap is proportionate to the length of 
recovery procedure showing that a two-year reduction in recovery times would involve an 
increase of market price of approximately 10 percentage points and, ceteris paribus, a 
significant contraction in long-term stocks of NPLs. 
 
3.3 Model specification 
As frequently emphasised by ECB and Bank of Italy the disposal of NPLs will take place 
gradually without pushing all banks, disregarding the peculiarities of each institution, to sell 
those assets on the market at the earliest opportunity (Ciavoliello et al., 2016). Nevertheless a 
better understanding of the width of the Pricing Gap and of the effects of a potential sale on 
Capital Ratios may provide important insights both for banks as well as for regulators. 
NPLs still represent one of the greatest weaknesses of the Italian banking system; they tied up 
relevant amounts of capital reducing the possibility of issuing new loans and therefore 
reducing bank profitability. 
I therefore decided to evaluate, for a sample of Italian banks, first the price gap under 
different hypothesis and afterwards the effects of a bad loans’ sale on Capital Adequacy and 
Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). 
The analysis has some similarities with the research of Jobst and Weber (2016) and uses the 
estimates of Ciavoliello et al. (2016) as a proxy for market prices. Complementary to the 
others studies mentioned, the analysis is not limited to estimating the losses following a 
massive sale of NPLs, but also tries to assess the effects on capital ratios under different 
hypothesis and scenarios. 
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The analysis’ steps can be summarised as follows: 
1. Estimate of different possible market value offered by investors; 
2. Calculation of the difference between market value and book value; 
3. Recalculation of the Capital Ratios (in particular of the Common Equity Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio) assuming the sale is established; this stages could be splitted in two parts: 
a. Effect on the Common Equity Tier 1 (numerator), 
b. Effects on the Risk-weighted Assets (denumerator); 
4. A comparison with the starting point and with minimum capital requirements is 
performed. 
Before starting the exposition of the various stages is important to identify a homogeneous 
class of exposures investigated for each bank of the sample. 
This is not insignificant since, according to the rules issued by the Bank of Italy, consistent 
with EU supervisory regulations, there are three different sub-categories of NPLs based on 
their different level of severity: “bad loans”, “unlikely-to-pay exposures” and “past due loans” 
(Bank of Italy, 2016a). More precisely: 
 Bad Loans (“Sofferenze”) are on and off-balance sheet exposures to a debtor in state of 
insolvency (even if not recognized by a court) or in substantially similar 
circumstances, irrespective of the bank’s own opinion on a potential loss; 
 Unlikely to pay (“Inadempienze Probabili”) exposures are those in respect of which, 
according to the bank’s own judgement, the debtor is assessed as unlikely to pay its 
obligation in full, without recourse actions or collateral realisation, regardless of any 
past due amount; 
 Past due and/or overdrawn exposures (“Esposizioni scadute e/o sconfinanti 
deteriorate”) are those that, excluding those classified as ‘bad loans’ and ‘unlikely to 
pay’, are past due or overdrawn continuously for more than 90 days and for above a 
predefined amount. 
From here on the analysis will focus only in the sale of the worst category, bad loans, 
amounting on average to more than half of all NPLs of the banks in the sample (63.1% of 
gross NPLs and 48.5% of net value). This hypothesis is motivated by the almost irreversible 
situation for loans classified as “sofferenze”, while assets in the other two categories have 
more chances to be reclassified as performing, e.g. through restructuring, and could be 
successfully worked-out internally. 
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3.3.1 Market Values’ and Pricing Gap’s estimation 
Unless loans are classified at fair value in the accounting portfolios, banks calculate the book 
value with the amortized cost method according to the international accounting principles IAS 
39 and soon IFRS 9.  
The amortized cost method requires discounting all the future expected cash flow (f) over the 
life of the loan using the original effective interest rate (i). The same method is certainly 
appropriate also to determine the net value of NPLs. 
Using the same technique, if a debtor is experiencing some difficulties in repaying the loan, 
the bank must assess the recoverable amount and the recovery time (t’) which is usually 
longer than the one originally stated in the loan contract. This assessment also encompasses 
the valuation of new cash flows (f’), taking into account the direct costs of managing NPLs 
but not the indirect ones37.  
Therefore the overall value adjustment of a bad loan could be expressed as the sum of value 
adjustments recorded over time, and it is equal to the difference between the original Gross 
Book Value (GBV) and the actual Net Book Value (NBV): 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐺𝐵𝑉 − 𝑁𝐵𝑉 = ∑ (
𝑓𝑡
(1+𝑖)𝑡
)
𝑇
𝑡=1
− ∑ (
f
t′
′
(1+i)t
′)
T′
t′=1
. 
A precise estimate of the net value of a portfolio of NPLs needs a detailed assessment of each 
position and cannot be performed only with publicly available data. Indeed, few market prices 
are available and the estimations vary greatly according to the characteristics of the loan sold 
(e.g.: type, guarantees, amount of the write-down). Therefore it is not possible to quote an 
average price representative for all exposures’ classes. 
To overcome this difficulty the estimation performed by Ciavoliello et al. (2016) has been 
used. Bearing in mind the amortized cost method they consider a hypothetical exposure 
classified as bad loan with an original value of 100 and an estimated cash flow equal to 47, 
collected at the end of the recovery procedure38 (supposed to last 4 years). 
Moreover, they assumed an original effective interest rate equal to 4% (consistent with the 
average interest rate documented during the Asset Quality Review conducted in the 2014). 
                                                          
37 Indirect costs, e.g. staff costs or fees paid to a servicer, must be recorder in the P&L statement of the 
relevant year. 
38 For the sake of simplicity only one inflow collected at the end of the recovery procedure has been 
considered, but partial reimbursement over time can be easily taken into account. 
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Therefore, using the formula above, from a bank’s point of view the net book value of this 
position would be 40.2% of the GBV and the value adjustment or coverage ratio is almost 
equal to 60%. 
As already sketched, from an investor’s point of view, the estimated value will be different 
since they immediately deduct from the price all the indirect management costs and because 
they search for a much higher internal rate of return (IRR) than the original effective interest 
rate used by banks. Ciavoliello et al. (2016), relying on their evidences, assumed an indirect 
management costs effect equal to 6% of nominal expected cash flow, while the IRR is 
supposed to be between 15 and 25 percent. According to these assumptions the purchase price 
for investors would be between 24.1 and 16.4 per cent of GBV, significantly lower with 
respect to the bank’s estimated value. 
For the purpose of our analysis the same assumptions have been used. Only the original 
hypothesis about recovery times and Investors’ IRR have been relaxed assuming a recovery 
times ranging from 1 to 6 years and investors’ IRR from 6% to 25%, as illustrated in the table 
below (Table 3). In this way we obtained a matrix with thirty different estimated market 
values, ranging from 41.52% to only 9.5% of the original GBV. The estimated value will be 
higher for shorter recovery times and lower IRR. 
Table 3: Estimation of Bad Loans’ market value 
 Recovery times 
In
v
es
to
rs
' I
R
R
 
  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 
6% 41.52% 39.01% 36.64% 34.41% 32.30% 30.31% 
10% 39.91% 36.02% 32.49% 29.28% 26.36% 23.71% 
15% 38.05% 32.72% 28.08% 24.05% 20.55% 17.50% 
20% 36.35% 29.82% 24.38% 19.85% 16.07% 12.92% 
25% 34.78% 27.26% 21.24% 16.43% 12.58% 9.50% 
Source: own calculation from Ciavoliello et al. (2016) data. 
Assumptions: 1) GBV equal to 100, expected value collected at maturity equal to 47, indirect 
costs amount to 6% of expected value collected at maturity. 
 
At this point the Pricing Gap is given by the difference between the estimated market value 
and the net book value, and can be expressed in euro as well as a percentage of the original 
gross book value. With this formulation negative values indicate a loss (i.e. the selling price is 
lower than the NBV); on the contrary the difference is positive if the selling price is higher 
than the NBV (i.e. the sale originates a gain): 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐺𝐴𝑃 = 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑁𝐵𝑉. 
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3.3.2 Recalculation of Capital Ratios 
In accordance with the Basel III frameworks banks are subjects to a number of capital 
requirements. The three main elements making up own funds are the Common Equity Tier 1 
(CET1), Additional Tier 1 (AT1) and the Tier 2 (T2). Summing up CET1 and AT1 we obtain 
the Tier 1 Capital, which added to Tier 2 Capital leads to the determination of the overall 
Own Funds. 
The Regulatory Framework (Bank of Italy, 2016b) accurately establishes the eligible 
components and the deductions or prudential filters for each category. Moreover it requires 
that institutions comply with the following minimum ratios, expressed as a percentage of the 
total risk exposure amount: 
 Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of at least 4.5%; 
 Tier 1 capital ratio at least equal to 6%; 
 Total Capital Ratio of 8%. 
In addition to the mandatory requirements prescribed, to date, the following capital buffers 
must be maintained by the Italian banks: 
 A Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB) of CET1 equal to 1.25% of their total risk 
exposure amount for the 2017 (1.875% from 2018 and 2.50% from 2019); 
 A Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) to reduce the procyclicality of the financial 
system, currently set at zero per cent by the Bank of Italy; 
 A Capital reserve for global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) and a Capital 
reserve for other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs) to increase their ability to 
absorb losses39; 
 And a Systemic Risk Buffer (SRB) to prevent or mitigate long-term structural 
systemic risks; this buffer is envisaged under EU law but not compulsory and it has 
not been introduced in Italy (Bank of Italy, 2017). 
In addition, every year the ECB performs the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
(SREP). Based on the information reviewed and evaluated, an overall valuation of the capital 
and liquidity acceptability of the supervised banks is made and a “SREP decision” for each 
supervised bank is prepared. 
                                                          
39 The Bank of Italy has identified one Italian banking group, Unicredit Group, as a G-SII and three banking 
group as O-SII (Unicredit, Intesa Sanpaolo and Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena). In accordance with European 
legislation, the Unicredit Group must apply only the higher between the G-SII and the O-SII requirements. 
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With the SREP decision the authority not only defines banks’ capital requirements, but it may 
also decide to impose additional measures on banks, including liquidity and qualitative 
measures. For what concerns capital requirements the ECB based on the individual bank risk 
profile, risk management and capital planning, may well impose additional capital 
requirements usually referred as “Pillar 2” (while Pillar 1 refers to the minimum capital a 
bank is required to hold by law). 
Moreover, for the first time with the 2016 SREP process, supervisors differentiate between 
Pillar 2 requirements and Pillar 2 guidance. The first one is binding and breaches can have 
direct legal consequences for banks, while non-compliance with the Pillar 2 guidance does not 
automatically trigger legal action (European Central Bank, 2016). 
For the purposes of our analysis the focus will be on the CET1 Ratio only and comparisons 
will be performed with respect to the minimum CET 1 requirements defined as the sum of 
4.5%, introduced Capital Buffers and of the Pillar 2 requirement. 
In general, as a consequence of a NPLs sale, there will be two different effects on Capital 
ratios. The first channel is the impact on the own funds, via income statement due to the 
losses (or gains) generate by the sale. The second channel is the increase/decrease of Risk 
Weighted Assets. 
Therefore the new Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio, after the hypothetical bad loans’ transfer, 
can be expressed as follows:  
𝐶𝐸𝑇1 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑁𝐸𝑊 =
CET1 Capital − Losses (+Gains)
RWA𝑁𝐸𝑊
 
 
CET1 Capital (Common Equity Tier 1 Capital) 
According to the Article 36 of the Capital Requirements Regulation, institutions shall deduct 
losses for the current financial year from Common Equity Tier. Conversely, interim or year-
end profits can only be included in CET1 capital with the prior permission of the competent 
authority and if the following conditions are met: these profits have been verified by an 
external auditor and any foreseeable charge or dividend has been deducted (CRR, Article 26). 
In our estimation the CET1 Capital as at December 31, 2016 is the starting point. The new 
one (CET1 RatioNEW) is obtained subtracting the losses or eventually adding the gains 
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stemming from the sale of Bad Loans. Moreover, for simplicity, all other costs and revenues 
potentially achieved by the company in the same period were disregarded. 
RWA (Risk-Weighted Assets) 
The impact on the denominator, i.e. Risk-Weighted Assets, arising from the sale of bad loans 
is not straightforward. 
For an institution adopting only the Standardized Method to evaluate the Credit Risk, 
defaulted exposures should be weighted either at 150% when specific credit risk adjustments 
are less than 20% or at 100% if specific credit risk adjustments are no less than 20%. More 
precisely, in Accordance to Article 127 of the CRR, these weights apply to the unsecured 
party only of the defaulted exposures. 
Therefore, following a sale, there will be a reduction of RWAs equal to the (net) amount of 
exposure sold times the assigned risk weight40, as stated in the equation below: 
𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑝𝑝 (𝑝𝑠) = RWA𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑝𝑝 − (Bad Loans net value) × (Risk weight). 
The same reasoning cannot be applied to banks adopting the internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approaches, especially the advanced one, indeed for those institutions estimating the effect on 
RWA in this way is not appropriate and can lead to a very misleading result. 
This aspect cannot be neglected since a significant fraction of the whole share of Loans to 
Customer and NPEs in the EU is subject to the A-IRB model. The same occurs in the sample 
considered, where seven banks out of ten got the permission to use the A-IRB model to 
evaluate some categories of Loans to customers.  
For banks using the advanced internal ratings-based method (A-IRB), as clearly explained by 
Gangeri et al. (2017) in a recent note, there is a negative impact on capital ratios, via RWA, 
from the higher estimated Loss Given Default (LGD) induced by the NPLs sale41. 
Their reasoning, also applied here, is based on the following considerations. 
First of all they assume that the average LGD on bad loans is close to the coverage ratio 
actually observed among Italian banks (in our elaboration the coverage ratio reported by each 
                                                          
40 Given the available data we assumed a uniform risk weight equal to 100%. 
41 More precisely there is an additional negative effect. The increase in LGD lead to an increase of the expected 
loss amounts for not sold exposures, which must be deducted from CET1 ratio or covered by further provisions. 
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bank, instead of the average one, has been used). Then the LGD after the sale is calculated as 
the mean between the initial LGD and the losses arising from the bad loans’ sale. 
Once defined the LGD variation post-sale it is worth nothing that the LGD for performing 
exposures can be written as a fraction (β) of the LGD for bad loans. 
𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓 = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑝𝑠) 
In other words, there is a linear relationship between LGDperf and LGDsoff(ps), so the 
proportional increase of LGDperf is, by definition, equal to the proportional increase of 
LGDsoff(ps) post-sale. 
Finally, according to the A-IRB formula for performing exposures, there is a linear 
dependence between LGD and RWA (%∆RWAA-IRB = %∆LGDperf) therefore the impact on 
RWA following a bad loans’ sale can be computed as follows: 
𝑅𝑊𝐴𝐴−𝐼𝑅𝐵 (𝑝𝑠) = RWA𝐴−𝐼𝑅𝐵 × (1 + %∆LGD𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓) 
Since banks in our sample do not evaluate all credit and counterparty risk with only one 
approach (except the three using only the Standardized approach) and since RWA comes also 
from market, operational and other specific risks, hereafter, the new value of Risk-Weighted 
Assets (i.e. post the hypothetical sale) is computed taking into account all the previous 
components as stated in the formula below: 
𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑁𝐸𝑊 = α × 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑝𝑝 (𝑝𝑠) + β × 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝐴−𝐼𝑅𝐵 (𝑝𝑠) + γ × 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠. 
The first component is weighted according to the percentage of the Credit risk (w.r.t. the 
overall RWA) coming from the Standardised approach (α) and the second according to the 
fraction of Credit risk (w.r.t. the overall RWA) calculated through the Internal rating based 
approach (β). 
The last components (RWAOthers), contains the other fractions of RWA (market and settlement 
risk, operational risk and other specific risks) and it is assumed not to change as a result of 
bad loans’ sale. 
Moreover, to compute the 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑝𝑝 (𝑝𝑠) we should know the net amount of Bad loans 
assessed through the Standardized Method. Since this data is not available we used as proxy 
the percentage of RWA coming from the Standardized approach42. 
                                                          
42 For example if net bad loans amount is €120 million and 70% of the Credit and Counterparty Risk comes from 
the Standardized method we assumed that €80 millions of Bad loans are assessed with the Stand. Approach. 
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3.4 Data Set and summary of data statistics 
To obtain a homogeneous sample, among the banks subject to the SSM, the largest 
commercial banks have been selected. Moreover, to ensure a wider availability of data, 
unlisted institutions have not been taken into consideration. 
As a result, our sample is formed by the following ten banks, ordered from largest to 
smallest43: Unicredit S.p.A., Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A., Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A., 
Banco Popolare, Unione di Banche Italiane S.p.A. (UBI), Bper Banca S.p.A., Banco Popolare 
di Milano (BPM), Credito Emiliano S.p.A., Banca Popolare di Sondrio ScpA, Banca Carige 
S.p.A. (Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia). 
For each of the 10 banks we collected a number of data for the last year either from the 
Thomson Reuters Eikon Database and from the last consolidated Annual Report (2016) 
published by each institute. 
The data collect from the Eikon Database mainly refer to granular Balance Sheet and Income 
Statement items, e.g. Loans to customers, Intangible assets, Total Assets, Shareholders’ 
Equity and Net income. 
Instead, from each Annual Report were collected more meticulous data related to the 
composition of Own Funds, Risk-weighted assets (also regarding the composition of the 
Credit and counterparty risk category) and Loans to customers. For this last item data were 
collected for both the gross and the net exposure and for each class exposures (Performing 
and non-performing). 
Moreover through a brief reading of the financial statements it was possible to collet, for each 
bank, data about minimum capital requirements (also including the minimum “Pillar 2 
requirements”) and about other relevant facts (e.g. recent or planned loan disposals and 
Capital increases). 
Based on these variables some ratios have been calculated, e.g. capital ratios, coverage ratios, 
Texas ratio and incidence of each class of NPLs w.r.t. total loans to customers. 
The main statistics are summarised in the Table 4 below, while a more detailed exposition of 
data and ratios is presented, for convenience, in Annex A. 
 
                                                          
43 The sample of bank is sorted on the basis of total assets, ranging from 859,533 million of Euro (Unicredit 
S.p.A.) to 26,111 million of Euro (Banca Carige S.p.A.).  
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Table 4: Main Statistics 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
The entire sample is characterized by a high incidence of loans to customers over total assets, 
which range from 50.30% to 72.83% with an average value of almost 56%. Overall the (net) 
loans to customers amount to 1,223 billion of euro, representing the 66.85% of all the Italian 
banking system44. 
All together the examined banks are burdened by € 240,080 million of NPLs, or equivalently 
€114,941 million net of value adjustments; representing respectively the 68.79% and 66.40% 
of the entire amount of Italian NPLs.  
The average coverage ratio is about 52%, in line with the banking system as a whole, but it 
varies significantly across banks from a minimum of 35.66% to an extreme of 62.93%. 
The incidence of NPLs over the total loans to customers amounts to 17.72% gross of 
adjustments or equivalently to 9.39% (net values). A great dispersion is observed within the 
sample, with percentages ranging from 5.76% to 34.46% (gross of adjustments) and from 
3.41% to 21.93% taking into account net values. For more details see Table 5 inside the 
Annex A. 
The sample also represents a large percentage of the Italian banking system’s Bad loans: 
70.46% gross of adjustments (€ 151,496 million) and 68.80% net of adjustments (€ 55,725 
million). 
The average Bad loans coverage ratio is about 63%, ranging from a minimum of 42.85% to a 
maximum of 73.07%. 
                                                          
44 This and the next comparisons are based on the data reported in the last available Financial Stability Report 
published by the Bank of Italy (2017). 
(mill ions of euro)
UCG ISP BMPS BP UBI BPER BPM CE BPSO CRG TOTAL
Loans to customer (net) 446.816 364.713 106.693 75.840    81.854    45.494    34.771    23.687    25.313    18.246    1.223.429 
as a % of total assets 51,98% 50,30% 69,65% 64,59% 72,83% 70,04% 68,00% 59,86% 68,05% 69,88% 55,95%
Total assets 859.533 725.100 153.179 117.411 112.384 64.957    51.131    39.569    37.196    26.111    2.186.571 
Equity (net of minorities interest) 39.336    48.911    6.426      7.575      8.990      4.881      4.364      2.474      2.588      2.109      127.654     
Company's net income (loss) 11.790-    3.111      3.241-      1.682-      830-          14            73            132          99            292-          14.406-       
Non-performing loans
- gross exposure 73.387    58.137    45.785    19.654    12.521    11.174    6.260      1.403      4.426      7.333      240.080     
- net exposure 27.204    29.767    20.320    12.568    8.056      6.197      3.636      807          2.382      4.002      114.941     
Bad loans
- gross exposure 48.844    37.834    29.424    10.916    7.261      7.039      3.497      856          2.100      3.726      151.496     
- net exposure 13.154    14.895    10.365    6.239      3.988      3.009      1.583      346          768          1.377      55.725       
NPLs Coverage ratio 62,93% 48,80% 55,62% 36,05% 35,66% 44,54% 41,92% 42,48% 46,17% 45,42% 52,12%
Bad loans Coverage ratio 73,07% 60,63% 64,77% 42,85% 45,08% 57,25% 54,72% 59,58% 63,43% 63,04% 63,22%
Risk-weighted assets 387.137 283.918 65.522    39.137    59.484    32.593    35.363    13.426    23.208    17.029    956.816     
CET 1 capital ratio 8,15% 12,65% 8,17% 12,97% 11,48% 13,80% 11,48% 13,15% 11,09% 11,41% 10,41%
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The same is detected for the incidence of Bad Loans over the total loans costumers, on 
average equal to 11.18% gross of adjustments (ranging from 3.51% to 22.15%), falling to 
4.55% net of adjustments (varying from 1.46% to 9.72%). 
Within the Table 6 (see Annex A) are reported the main capital ratios and the decomposition 
of Risk Weight Assets (RWA).  
As already mentioned three banks rely only on the Standardized approach to assess the Credit 
and counterparty risks, while others seven use both Standardised as well as Internal rating 
based approach. Five banks out of seven rely more on Internal rating based approaches while 
for other two credit risks comes mostly from the standardised approach. Moreover, for all the 
considered banks the majority of the RWA comes from Credit and Counterparty risks, 
accounting on average for 85.23% of the entire Risk Weighted Assets (and ranging from 
81.67% to 93.45%). 
The CET 1 Capital ratio is on average equal to 10.41%, oscillating from a minimum of 8.15% 
to a maximum of 13.80%. Excluding Unicredit S.p.A. and Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
S.p.A., it would be equal to 12.43%. 
The two institutes just mentioned at the end of 2016 were the only temporarily not compliant 
with the Minimum capital Requirements as defined before. 
Unicredit has restored compliance with SREP 2016 requirements in March 2017 through a 
capital increase of €13 billion, pushing the CET 1 Ratio to 11.5%. While Banca Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena recently receives €5.4 billion of State Aid through a Precautionary 
recapitalizations. Including this capital increase the CET 1 Ratio amount to 15.4%, well above 
minimum requirements. 
For the additional capital ratios similar observations can be made, the Tier Capital Ratio is on 
average equal to 11.17% (ranging from 8.17% to 13.9%) while the Total Capital Ratio 
amount to 13.81% (varying from 10.4% to 17%). 
Finally, for each bank the CET 1 Ratio is above the minimum capital requirements provided 
by the Basel III framework (4.5%). Also considering the capital buffer and the additional 
requirements provided by the ECB through the SREP45 (also called “Pillar 2 requirement”) 
the majority of the banks are well above the minimum level, and the two non-conforming 
banks have already adjusted their position. 
 
                                                          
45 The Pillar 2 guidance has been excluded since it does not automatically trigger legal action and especially 
because it is not made public by the majority of the analysed banks. 
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3.5 Analysis of results 
For each bank of the described sample we simulated the sale of the whole bulk of Bad Loans. 
This is merely a theoretical exercise, since such a large offer would hardly be absorbed by a 
not well developed market and in any case would further depress market prices. 
The purpose of this analysis is exactly the opposite: show how recent reforms to reduce 
recovery times should translate in higher market prices, thus lower Price GAP and ultimately 
should encourage transfer of NPLs. At the same time private initiatives, like the Atlante Fund, 
can further reduce the distance between book value and market value. 
The Table 7 illustrates the new NPLs amounts after the sale. With this exercise the overall Net 
NPLs’ amount drops to €59,216 million (-48.48%). The fall is more accentuated for big banks 
(close to 50%), but also for small ones is significant (included in the range between -34% and 
-44%).  
The NPLs ratio oscillates in a similar way: from 17.72% to 7.36% gross of adjustments (-
59%), and from 9.39% to 5.07% in net terms (-46%). 
Assuming such a massive balance sheet cleaning operation is performed the NPLs ratio would 
be halved and only slightly above the European average as reported in the EBA Risk 
Dashboard (see Figure 8). Furthermore the NPLs ratio, net of the adjustment, would approach 
their historical average of 3-4% (Aiyar et al., 2017). 
Simultaneously the Coverage ratio would also decrease from 52% to 33%, this sharp decline 
is to be found in the lower risk density of the remaining NPLs, composed only by Unlikely to 
pay and Past due loans. 
Table 7: New NPLs and Ratios after the sale of bad loans  
 
Source: own elaboration. 
(mill ions of euro)
Pre-sale Post-sale % change Pre-sale Post-sale Pre-sale Post-sale Pre-sale Post-sale
UCG 27.204     14.050     -48,35% 14,82% 5,50% 6,09% 3,24% 62,93% 42,75%
ISP 29.767     14.872     -50,04% 14,72% 5,69% 8,16% 4,25% 48,80% 26,75%
BMPS 20.320     9.955       -51,01% 34,46% 15,82% 19,05% 10,33% 55,62% 39,15%
BP 12.568     6.330       -49,64% 23,63% 12,09% 16,57% 9,09% 36,05% 27,56%
UBI 8.056       4.068       -49,50% 14,44% 6,62% 9,84% 5,22% 35,66% 22,66%
BPER 6.197       3.188       -48,56% 22,06% 9,48% 13,62% 7,50% 44,54% 22,89%
BPM 3.636       2.053       -43,55% 16,67% 8,12% 10,46% 6,18% 41,92% 25,73%
CE 807           461           -42,87% 5,76% 2,33% 3,41% 1,98% 42,48% 15,72%
BPSO 2.382       1.614       -32,23% 16,10% 9,16% 9,41% 6,58% 46,17% 30,59%
CRG 4.002       2.625       -34,41% 33,77% 20,05% 21,93% 15,56% 45,42% 27,23%
TOTAL 114.941   59.216     -48,48% 17,72% 7,36% 9,39% 5,07% 52,12% 33,15%
% of NPLs (net) Coverage Ratio% of NPLs (gross)Net NPLs' amount
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Such a large decrease of NPLs’ ratios has also some drawbacks. Indeed it is of great interest 
to understand if such plan can be sustained by the analysed banks. This can be perceived 
observing the Price GAPs and even more recalculating the new CET1 Ratio post-sale. 
The price gap is computed subtracting the estimated Bad loans’ market value from their Net 
Book Value. The results, for each bank and for each combination of time and interest rate, are 
reported in percentage term in the next figure (Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Estimated percentage Price GAPs between market value and book value 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Note: A negative percentage means that the estimated market value is lower than the net book value (e.g. suppose that the 
gross value of a loan is 1,000, the net book value is 270 and the estimated market price only 200; therefore the difference 
between market and book value is -70 or equivalently -7% of the Gross Book Value), while a positive percentage means the 
estimated market value is higher than the net book value (i.e. the sale originates a gain).  
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
6% 14,59% 12,08% 9,71% 7,48% 5,37% 3,38% 6% 2,15% -0,36% -2,73% -4,96% -7,07% -9,06%
10% 12,98% 9,09% 5,56% 2,35% -0,57% -3,22% 10% 0,54% -3,35% -6,88% -10,09% -13,01% -15,66%
15% 11,12% 5,79% 1,15% -2,88% -6,38% -9,43% 15% -1,32% -6,65% -11,29% -15,32% -18,82% -21,87%
20% 9,42% 2,89% -2,55% -7,08% -10,86% -14,01% 20% -3,02% -9,55% -14,99% -19,52% -23,30% -26,45%
25% 7,85% 0,33% -5,69% -10,50% -14,35% -17,43% 25% -4,59% -12,11% -18,13% -22,94% -26,79% -29,87%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
6% 6,29% 3,78% 1,41% -0,82% -2,93% -4,91% 6% -15,63% -18,14% -20,51% -22,75% -24,85% -26,84%
10% 4,68% 0,80% -2,74% -5,95% -8,86% -11,52% 10% -17,25% -21,13% -24,66% -27,87% -30,79% -33,44%
15% 2,82% -2,51% -7,14% -11,17% -14,68% -17,73% 15% -19,10% -24,43% -29,07% -33,10% -36,61% -39,65%
20% 1,12% -5,41% -10,85% -15,38% -19,16% -22,31% 20% -20,81% -27,33% -32,77% -37,31% -41,09% -44,23%
25% -0,45% -7,97% -13,98% -18,80% -22,65% -25,73% 25% -22,37% -29,89% -35,91% -40,72% -44,57% -47,65%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
6% -13,40% -15,91% -18,28% -20,52% -22,62% -24,61% 6% -1,23% -3,74% -6,11% -8,34% -10,45% -12,44%
10% -15,02% -18,90% -22,43% -25,64% -28,56% -31,21% 10% -2,84% -6,73% -10,26% -13,47% -16,39% -19,04%
15% -16,87% -22,20% -26,84% -30,87% -34,38% -37,42% 15% -4,70% -10,03% -14,67% -18,70% -22,20% -25,25%
20% -18,58% -25,10% -30,54% -35,08% -38,86% -42,00% 20% -6,40% -12,93% -18,37% -22,90% -26,68% -29,83%
25% -20,14% -27,66% -33,68% -38,49% -42,34% -45,42% 25% -7,97% -15,49% -21,51% -26,32% -30,17% -33,25%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
6% -3,76% -6,27% -8,64% -10,87% -12,98% -14,97% 6% 1,10% -1,41% -3,78% -6,01% -8,12% -10,11%
10% -5,38% -9,26% -12,79% -16,00% -18,92% -21,57% 10% -0,51% -4,40% -7,93% -11,14% -14,06% -16,71%
15% -7,23% -12,56% -17,20% -21,23% -24,74% -27,78% 15% -2,37% -7,70% -12,34% -16,37% -19,87% -22,92%
20% -8,94% -15,46% -20,90% -25,44% -29,21% -32,36% 20% -4,07% -10,60% -16,04% -20,57% -24,35% -27,50%
25% -10,50% -18,02% -24,04% -28,85% -32,70% -35,78% 25% -5,64% -13,16% -19,18% -23,99% -27,84% -30,92%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
6% 4,95% 2,44% 0,07% -2,16% -4,27% -6,26% 6% 4,56% 2,05% -0,32% -2,56% -4,66% -6,65%
10% 3,34% -0,55% -4,08% -7,29% -10,21% -12,86% 10% 2,94% -0,94% -4,47% -7,68% -10,60% -13,25%
15% 1,48% -3,85% -8,49% -12,52% -16,02% -19,07% 15% 1,09% -4,25% -8,88% -12,91% -16,42% -19,46%
20% -0,22% -6,75% -12,19% -16,73% -20,50% -23,65% 20% -0,62% -7,15% -12,58% -17,12% -20,90% -24,04%
25% -1,79% -9,31% -15,33% -20,14% -23,99% -27,07% 25% -2,18% -9,70% -15,72% -20,53% -24,38% -27,46%
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As expected, the percentage price gap would be larger for higher Investors’ IRR and for 
sluggish recovery procedures. In most cases a sale of Bad Loans would generate a loss since 
the value given by potential investors is typically lower than the book value. 
Hence, according to our estimations, a capital gain is theoretically possible for banks with a 
high Coverage Ratio, with a drastic decline of recovery procedures’ duration and for 
Investors’ IRR not too high (e.g. Unicredit and Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena); a situation 
far from the current one. 
Furthermore the variance of Coverage ratios within the sample explains the different haircuts 
on the net book values46. 
The evolution of Capital Ratios is of more interest. Although a NPLs sale usually generates a 
loss, it can still be bearable it the effect on Capital Ratios is not too heavy, i.e. if the Capital 
Ratios remain higher than the minimum requirements. 
Hence for each bank and combination the 𝐶𝐸𝑇1 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑁𝐸𝑊, as defined in the model 
specification, has been computed. The results are reported in the Figure 10 below. 
Red boxes indicate a new CET1 Ratio lower than 4.5%, i.e. the minimum level required by 
the Basel III framework. 
As a matter of fact the minimum Capital Requirement in terms of CET1 is well above 4,5%. 
For the banks in our sample, including also the different Capital Buffers and the Pillar 2 
requirements, the minimum requirement would varies from 6.7% to 10.75%. Then yellow 
bokes represents all the new CET1 Ratio which, despite being higher than 4.5%, are lower 
than the overall minimum required CET 1 Ratio47. 
Light green and dark green boxes denote, respectively, the cases where the new CET1 Ratio 
would be higher than the overall minimum requirement and situations where it would be also 
higher than the initial CET 1 Ratio as of 31.12.2016. 
Overall four banks out of ten would be able to meet the minimum capital requirements for 
each assessed combination, even the most restrictive. Additionally they could even improve 
the CET1 Ratio in particularly favourable scenarios. 
Other four institutes would be able to meet the requested CET1 Ratio only in some states. 
While only for two banks out of ten there would be a violation of the minimum requirements 
almost in every situation, with values even below than 4.5%. 
                                                          
46 It is worth remembering that the estimated market value depends only on the recovery time and on the 
expected Investors’ IRR, so it does not take into account the specificities of each bank. 
47 Since the Pillar 2 requirement depends also on the bank risk profile, it is logical to foresee a reduction 
following the sale of the riskiest category of customer loans. 
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Figure 10: Recalculated CET1 Ratio for each bank of the sample 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
* For Unicredit and Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, since the CET1 Ratio as of 31.12.2016 is lower than the Minimum 
Capital Requirements (capital buffer and Pillar 2 Requirement included) this condition is not applicable.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
6% 10,57% 10,17% 9,80% 9,45% 9,12% 8,82% 6% 13,40% 12,94% 12,51% 12,12% 11,75% 11,41%
10% 10,31% 9,70% 9,15% 8,67% 8,23% 7,84% 10% 13,10% 12,40% 11,78% 11,23% 10,74% 10,30%
15% 10,02% 9,19% 8,48% 7,89% 7,37% 6,94% 15% 12,77% 11,82% 11,03% 10,35% 9,78% 9,30%
20% 9,75% 8,75% 7,93% 7,27% 6,73% 6,29% 20% 12,46% 11,32% 10,41% 9,67% 9,08% 8,59%
25% 9,51% 8,36% 7,48% 6,79% 6,24% 5,82% 25% 12,18% 10,89% 9,90% 9,13% 8,54% 8,07%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
6% 12,10% 10,75% 9,51% 8,35% 7,28% 6,28% 6% 8,80% 7,99% 7,25% 6,56% 5,92% 5,33%
10% 11,23% 9,18% 7,38% 5,77% 4,35% 3,08% 10% 8,28% 7,06% 5,98% 5,03% 4,19% 3,44%
15% 10,24% 7,49% 5,19% 3,25% 1,60% 0,21% 15% 7,69% 6,05% 4,68% 3,54% 2,58% 1,76%
20% 9,35% 6,04% 3,40% 1,28% -0,43% -1,83% 20% 7,16% 5,19% 3,63% 2,39% 1,38% 0,57%
25% 8,54% 4,78% 1,93% -0,27% -1,98% -3,31% 25% 6,67% 4,45% 2,77% 1,48% 0,49% -0,29%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
6% 9,42% 9,01% 8,63% 8,28% 7,96% 7,66% 6% 14,10% 13,40% 12,75% 12,15% 11,60% 11,08%
10% 9,16% 8,53% 7,98% 7,50% 7,08% 6,71% 10% 13,65% 12,59% 11,65% 10,82% 10,08% 9,43%
15% 8,85% 8,02% 7,33% 6,75% 6,27% 5,86% 15% 13,13% 11,71% 10,52% 9,51% 8,66% 7,94%
20% 8,58% 7,58% 6,80% 6,18% 5,68% 5,28% 20% 12,67% 10,96% 9,59% 8,49% 7,61% 6,89%
25% 8,34% 7,21% 6,37% 5,73% 5,23% 4,85% 25% 12,25% 10,31% 8,83% 7,69% 6,81% 6,12%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
6% 11,62% 11,36% 11,12% 10,89% 10,67% 10,46% 6% 13,40% 13,06% 12,76% 12,47% 12,21% 11,97%
10% 11,46% 11,05% 10,69% 10,36% 10,05% 9,78% 10% 13,18% 12,68% 12,24% 11,85% 11,51% 11,20%
15% 11,26% 10,71% 10,23% 9,82% 9,45% 9,14% 15% 12,94% 12,26% 11,71% 11,24% 10,85% 10,52%
20% 11,09% 10,41% 9,85% 9,38% 8,99% 8,66% 20% 12,72% 11,91% 11,28% 10,78% 10,37% 10,05%
25% 10,93% 10,15% 9,52% 9,03% 8,63% 8,31% 25% 12,52% 11,61% 10,93% 10,41% 10,01% 9,70%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
6% 11,93% 11,70% 11,48% 11,27% 11,07% 10,89% 6% 13,49% 12,90% 12,33% 11,80% 11,30% 10,83%
10% 11,78% 11,42% 11,09% 10,79% 10,52% 10,27% 10% 13,11% 12,19% 11,35% 10,58% 9,89% 9,26%
15% 11,61% 11,11% 10,68% 10,30% 9,97% 9,69% 15% 12,67% 11,40% 10,30% 9,34% 8,50% 7,78%
20% 11,45% 10,84% 10,33% 9,91% 9,55% 9,26% 20% 12,26% 10,71% 9,41% 8,34% 7,44% 6,69%
25% 11,30% 10,60% 10,04% 9,59% 9,23% 8,94% 25% 11,89% 10,10% 8,67% 7,52% 6,61% 5,87%
Legend
Rec. CET1 Ratio < 4.5%
Rec. CET1 Ratio < Capital Requirements (Buffers and Pillar 2 included)
Capital Requirements < Rec. CET1 Ratio < CET1 Ratio as of 31.12.16 (if applicable*)
Rec. CET1 Ratio > CET1 Ratio as of 31.12.16 (and greather than  Capital Requirements)
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The two banks achieving the worst outcomes are Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Banco 
Popolare. The first one, considering data as of 31 December 2016, is characterized either by a 
percentage of bad loans that is more than twice the average and by one of the lowest CET1 
Ratios. Though Banco Popolare result’s is similar it depends more on the fairly low Bad 
loans’ coverage ratio (43% versus an average of 63%) rather than by a lack of capital. 
Moreover it is worth to remember that all the analysis rest on data as of 31 December 2016. 
Taking into account the recapitalizations carried out or planned by some banks in the course 
of the current year, the results would be even better. 
Before we argued that recent reforms are likely to reduce the severity of the price haircut. To 
provide some support to this statement a comparison between different scenarios was also 
made (see Table 8). 
Consistently with the results of a survey of recovery times for credit to firms carried out by 
the Bank of Italy in 2015 (Carpinelli et al., 2016) the expected recovery times in 2015 was 
close to 4 years while the Investors’ IRR can be as high as 18-20 per cent of net profits 
(Ciavoliello et al., 2016; Quaestio Capital Management SGR S.p.A., 2016).  
The Baseline scenario depicted in the first two columns is based on these two findings and 
may be a good proxy of the Italian situation before the recent reforms. 
In this situation the new CET 1 Ratio of five banks out of ten would be below the minimum 
Capital Requirements. 
The “Scenario A” is built to take into account the effects of recent reforms to reduce the 
recovery time, in fact it is based on a recovery time of 3 years (-1 year) while the IRR does 
not vary. Though four banks would breach the minimum capital requirements there are some 
improvements: the average CET1 Ratio post-sale would increase from 7.33% to 8.19% and 
the percentage price gap would drop from 16.98% to 12.45%. 
The third scenario (Scenario B) takes into account the existence of private initiatives to 
acquire tranches of NPL securitizations, like the Atlante Fund, with financial objectives 
significantly lower than the IRR usually achieve by specialized investors. Therefore the 
Investors’ IRR is assumed to be halved (from 20% to 10%) while the recovery time does not 
vary. The figures shown in the table show a noticeable improvement: the average CET1 Ratio 
after the sale would be 9.19%, the percentage price gap reduces to 7.55% and only three 
banks would be below the minimum capital requirements. 
The last scenario (Scenario C) combines the two previous, assuming both a decrease of the 
recovery times (from 4 to 3 years) and a halving of investors’ IRR (from 20% to 10%). In this 
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case only Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Banco Popolare would not meet the minimum 
requirements. Additionally the average percentage Gap would drop to just 4.34%, even if it 
remains rather wide for banks with low coverage ratios. 
Table 8: Sensitive of CET1 Ratios and Price GAPs 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Notes. Baseline Scenario: recovery times of 4 years and investors’ IRR equal to 20%. Scenario A: recovery times of 3 years 
and investors’ IRR equal to 20%. Scenario B: recovery times of 4 years and investors’ IRR equal to 10%. Scenario C: 
recovery times of 3 years and investors’ IRR equal to 10%. 
 
Last of all, we devoted some attention on the various factors affecting the CET 1 Ratio and 
that determines the change w.r.t. the CET 1 Ratio as of 31.12.2016. 
We have already explained that the CET1 Ratio usually shrinks after a bad loans’ sale. In our 
estimation this reduction is the consequence of the three following factors: 
 a reduction of the CET 1 Capital attributable to the losses generated by the sale 
(negative effect); 
 a reduction of RWA for the banks adopting the Standardized Method to evaluate the 
credit risk (positive effect); 
 an increase of RWA (negative effect) for the banks adopting A-IRB methods to 
evaluate the credit risk. 
The next figure (Figure 11) assess the effect of each different factor, starting from the CET 1 
Ratio as of 31.12.2016 and adding first the losses generate by the bad loans’ sale, then the 
reduction of RWA due to the fraction of loans valuated through the standardized method and 
finally the increase in RWA due to the application of the A-IRB method. 
All the ratios are expressed in basis points and the calculation is made using the Scenario C 
reported in the previous Table (Investors’ IRR of 10% and a recovery time of 3 years). 
 New CET1 
Ratio 
 Price 
GAP 
 New CET1 
Ratio 
 Price 
GAP 
 New CET1 
Ratio 
 Price 
GAP 
 New CET1 
Ratio 
 Price 
GAP 
UCG 7,27% -7,08% 7,93% -2,55% 8,67% 2,35% 9,15% 5,56% 8,78%
ISP 9,67% -19,52% 10,41% -14,99% 11,23% -10,09% 11,78% -6,88% 7,25%
BMPS 1,28% -15,38% 3,40% -10,85% 5,77% -5,95% 7,38% -2,74% 10,75%
BP 2,39% -37,31% 3,63% -32,77% 5,03% -27,87% 5,98% -24,66% 8,15%
UBI 6,18% -35,08% 6,80% -30,54% 7,50% -25,64% 7,98% -22,43% 7,50%
BPER 8,49% -22,90% 9,59% -18,37% 10,82% -13,47% 11,65% -10,26% 7,25%
BPM 9,38% -25,44% 9,85% -20,90% 10,36% -16,00% 10,69% -12,79% 8,15%
CE 10,78% -20,57% 11,28% -16,04% 11,85% -11,14% 12,24% -7,93% 6,75%
BPSO 9,91% -16,73% 10,33% -12,19% 10,79% -7,29% 11,09% -4,08% 7,25%
CRG 8,34% -17,12% 9,41% -12,58% 10,58% -7,68% 11,35% -4,47% 9,00%
TOTAL 7,33% -16,98% 8,19% -12,45% 9,14% -7,55% 9,78% -4,34% 8,23%
Baseline Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
Min CET1 
Ratio
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Figure 11: Breakdown of the effects on the new CET 1 Ratio 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Note. The estimation is based on the “Scenario C”: recovery times of 3 years and investors’ IRR equal to 10%. 
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The overall effect, according to our expectations, is negative for nine banks out of 10, only 
Unicredit would increase its CET 1 Ratio by 100 basis points. 
Decomposing the factors is possible to notice that biggest effect comes from the Price GAP, 
even if the average Price GAP in the “Scenario C” is only 4.34%, leading alone to a reduction 
of the CET 1 Ratio between 37 and 688 basis points. 
The increase of RWAs, via the higher Loss Given Default, for banks adopting the A-IRB 
Method results in a modest decrease of CET 1 Ratio between 8 and 103 basis points. 
While the positive effect on RWA due to the lower risk density of assets evaluated with the 
Standardized approach is really modest and it translates into an increase of CET 1 Ratio 
between 10 and 92 points. 
Replicating the same analysis for the Baseline Scenario the results would be similar; the last 
two effects are modest and tend to offset each other, while the main cause of the reduction of 
CET 1 Ratio remains the Price GAP. 
Due to the higher IRR and recovery times assumed in the Baseline scenario the average price 
gap is estimated to be almost 17% of the gross book value and accordingly the impact on CET 
1 Ratio is much broader, ranging from -89 to -1.041 basis points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the first part of the thesis the focus was on the Financial Crisis of 2007-08 and on the 
actions undertaken at global level. Then the attention shifted on the improvements required to 
manage and dispose NPLs stocks, investigating the main internal and external solutions.  
The last part of the analysis is focalized on Italy; an interesting case study because, despite 
some improvements, remains one of the European countries with the highest level of NPLs. 
After briefly discussing the reform process started in the 2015 and other two initiatives (the 
tool called GACS and the private fund Atlante), a study of the “Price GAP” and of its effects 
on Capital Requirements has been performed. 
The analysis has some similarities with the research of Jobst and Weber (2016) and uses the 
estimates of Ciavoliello et al. (2016) as a proxy for market prices. Complementary to the 
others studies mentioned, our research is not limited to estimating the losses following a 
massive sale of NPLs, but also tries to assess the effects on capital ratios under different 
hypothesis and scenarios. 
As regard the model specification the different steps can be summarised as follows. First 
using the research performed by Ciavoliello et al. (2016) we estimated a matrix with thirty 
possible Bad Loans’ market value, according to recovery times and investors’ IRR. Then, the 
Price Gap is computed as the difference between each estimated market value and net book 
value. 
The recalculation of CET 1 Capital Ratio could be splitted into two parts; first we figured the 
effect on the CET 1, by subtracting the losses stemming from this hypothetical sale and then 
we recomputed the new amount of Risk-weighted assets. This last evaluation is carried out in 
a different way subject to the model used to evaluate Credit Risk: Standardized Method or 
Internal ratings-based Method (IRB). 
In the first case, there will be a reduction of RWA (positive effect) assumed equal to the (net) 
amount of exposures sold times the assigned risk weight. Differently for banks adopting the 
Advanced-IRB, due to the higher estimated Loss Given Default (LGD) induced by the NPL 
sale, there will be an increase of RWA (negative effect). 
The results we obtained are based on a sample of ten Italian commercial banks. Overall, the 
sample represents a large fraction of the Italian banking system’s NPLs (66% net of value 
adjustments) and Bad Loans (69% net of value adjustments). 
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Assuming the sale of the entire stock of Bad Loans, the overall Net NPLs’ amount would 
reduce by more than 48%; simultaneously the Coverage ratio would also decrease due to the 
lower risk density of outstanding loans. 
The Price GAP, as expected, would be larger for higher Investors’ IRR and for sluggish 
recovery procedures. In most cases, a sale of Bad Loans would generate a loss since the value 
given by potential investors is typically lower than the book value; hence, according to our 
estimations, a capital gain is theoretically possible for banks with a high Coverage Ratio, with 
a drastic decline of recovery procedures’ duration and for Investors’ IRR not too high. 
Shifting the focus on CET 1 Capital Ratio, according to our estimations, four banks out of ten 
would be able to meet the minimum Capital Requirements (including also Capital Buffers and 
the Pillar 2 Requirements) for each assessed combination, even the most restrictive; other four 
only in some states; and only for two banks there would be a violation of the minimum 
requirements almost in every situation. 
Subsequently four different scenarios were analyses, assuming either a reduction of recovery 
times or of investor’ IRR. Assuming, both a decrease of the recovery times of one year (from 
4 to 3 years) and a halving of investors’ IRR (from 20% to 10%), only two banks would not 
meet the minimum requirements. Additionally the average percentage Gap would drop to just 
4.3% (from 17% in the Baseline scenario), even if it remains rather wide for banks with low 
coverage ratios. 
Last of all, we estimated each factor affecting the CET 1 Ratio separately. According to our 
estimations, the biggest effect comes from the Price GAP (leading alone to a reduction of the 
CET 1 Ratio between 37 and 688 basis points); the increase of RWAs, via the higher LGD, 
results in a modest decrease of CET 1 Ratio and the positive effect on RWA, due to the lower 
risk density of assets evaluated with the Standardized approach, turns out to be really modest. 
In conclusion, even if assuming the sale of the whole bulk of Bad Loans is merely a 
theoretical exercise, since such a large offer would further depress market prices, our results 
provide some evidence of the resilience of the Italian banking system. Indeed a large fraction 
of the sample would be able to meet Minimum Capital Requirement in most scenarios. 
Moreover our research highlights how reforms aimed at reducing recovery times, when fully 
into force, should translate into higher market prices, thus lowering Price GAP and ultimately 
encouraging transfer of NPLs. At the same time the presence of funds, like Atlante Fund, with 
lower expected yields than specialized operators could further reduce the distance between 
book and market value. 
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ANNEX A: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Table 5 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Note: The Texas Ratio is computed as [Net NPLs amount] / [Equity inclusive of minorities interests – Intangible assets]. 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Note: The minimum CET 1 Ratio is computed as the sum of 4,5%, Capital Buffers and of Pillar 2 requirements required by 
SREP 2016 from 01.01.2017 (Pillar 2 Guidance is not included). 
 
 
 
(mill ions of euro)
UCG ISP BMPS BP UBI BPER BPM CE BPSO CRG TOTAL
Gross exposure
Non-performing loans, of which 73.387    58.137    45.785    19.654    12.521    11.174    6.260      1.403      4.426      7.333      240.080     
Bad loans 48.844 37.834 29.424 10.916 7.261    7.039    3.497    856       2.100    3.726    151.496   
Unlikely to pay 23.165 19.745 15.247 8.619    5.119    3.977    2.730    504       1.988    3.487    84.580     
Past due loans 1.378    558       1.114    119       141       158       34          43          339       120       4.004       
Performing loans 421.804 336.781 87.061    63.528    74.178    39.481    31.287    22.950    23.071    14.380    1.114.521 
Total 495.191 394.918 132.846 83.182    86.699    50.654    37.548    24.353    27.497    21.713    1.354.601 
Net exposure
Non-performing loans, of which 27.204    29.767    20.320    12.568    8.056      6.197      3.636      807          2.382      4.002      114.941     
Bad loans 13.154    14.895    10.365    6.239       3.988       3.009       1.583       346          768          1.377       55.725        
Unlikely to pay 13.144    14.435    9.101       6.234       3.935       3.043       2.023       425          1.323       2.524       56.187        
Past due loans 906          437          854          95             133          145          30             36             292          101          3.029          
Performing loans 419.612 334.946 86.373    63.272    73.799    39.297    31.135    22.881    22.931    14.244    1.108.489 
Total 446.816 364.713 106.693 75.840    81.855    45.494    34.771    23.688    25.313    18.246    1.223.430 
Ratios
NPLs Coverage ratio 62,93% 48,80% 55,62% 36,05% 35,66% 44,54% 41,92% 42,48% 46,17% 45,42% 52,12%
Bad loans Coverage ratio 73,07% 60,63% 64,77% 42,85% 45,08% 57,25% 54,72% 59,58% 63,43% 63,04% 63,22%
% of NPLs (gross amount) 14,82% 14,72% 34,46% 23,63% 14,44% 22,06% 16,67% 5,76% 16,10% 33,77% 17,72%
% of NPLs (net amount) 6,09% 8,16% 19,05% 16,57% 9,84% 13,62% 10,46% 3,41% 9,41% 21,93% 9,39%
% of Bad loans (gross amount) 9,86% 9,58% 22,15% 13,12% 8,37% 13,90% 9,31% 3,51% 7,64% 17,16% 11,18%
% of Bad loans (net amount) 2,94% 4,08% 9,72% 8,23% 4,87% 6,61% 4,55% 1,46% 3,03% 7,55% 4,55%
Texas Ratio 68,01% 71,00% 332,30% 213,28% 109,37% 123,01% 84,88% 38,97% 89,95% 192,26% 107,99%
(mill ions of euro)
UCG ISP BMPS BP UBI BPER BPM CE BPSO CRG TOTAL
Risk-weighted assets
1. Credit and counterparty risks 331.182  242.312  53.521    34.665    54.388    27.226    32.105    11.695    20.565    15.916    823.575  
of which Standardised approach 180.076  114.333  23.196    19.687    24.479    12.722    32.074    3.414      20.250    15.914    446.146  
of which Internal rating based approach 148.203  123.656  30.318    14.913    29.909    14.130    -           8.253      -           -           369.382  
- Basic 11.906     6.622       -            -            -            -            -            -            -            -            18.528     
- Advanced 136.297  117.034  30.318     14.913     29.909     14.130     -            8.253       -            -            350.854  
of which Securitisations 2.903      4.323      7               65            -           374          31            28            315          2               8.048      
2. Other 55.955    41.606    12.001    4.472      5.096      5.367      3.258      1.730      2.642      1.113      133.241  
Total 387.137  283.918  65.522    39.137    59.484    32.593    35.363    13.426    23.208    17.029    956.816  
% Credit risk, of which 84,80% 83,82% 81,67% 88,41% 91,43% 82,39% 90,70% 86,90% 87,26% 93,45% 85,23%
- Standardised approach 46,51% 40,27% 35,40% 50,30% 41,15% 39,03% 90,70% 25,43% 87,26% 93,45% 46,63%
- Int. Rating based approach 38,28% 43,55% 46,27% 38,10% 50,28% 43,35% n.a. 61,47% n.a. n.a. 38,61%
% Other 15,20% 16,18% 18,33% 11,59% 8,57% 17,61% 9,30% 13,10% 12,74% 6,55% 14,77%
Own funds
CET 1 capital net of regulatory adjustments 31.537    35.926    5.353      5.077      6.829      4.498      4.058      1.765      2.574      1.942      99.560    
CET 1 capital ratio 8,15% 12,65% 8,17% 12,97% 11,48% 13,80% 11,48% 13,15% 11,09% 11,41% 10,41%
TIER 1 capital net of regulatory adjustments 35.005    39.459    5.353      5.119      6.829      4.527      4.189      1.765      2.580      2.040      106.867  
TIER 1 capital ratio 9,04% 13,90% 8,17% 13,08% 11,48% 13,89% 11,84% 13,15% 11,12% 11,98% 11,17%
Total own funds 45.150    48.274    6.817      6.330      8.389      4.959      4.730      1.939      3.151      2.358      132.096  
Total capital ratio 11,66% 17,00% 10,40% 16,17% 14,10% 15,21% 13,38% 14,44% 13,58% 13,85% 13,81%
Minimum CET 1 Ratio (SREP 2016) 8,78% 7,25% 10,75% 8,15% 7,50% 7,25% 8,15% 6,75% 7,25% 9,00%
of which minimum Pillar 2 requirements 2,50% 1,50% 5,00% 2,40% 1,75% 1,50% 2,40% 1,00% 1,50% 3,25%
